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Sammendrag 
Å ta hensyn til målefeil er viktig når man estimerer persistens i økonomiske kjennetegn (slik som 
inntekt) fra en generasjon til en annen. Tradisjonelt har man fokusert på persistens (overføring) kun 
mellom foreldre og barn. I denne situasjonen er disse mekanismene relativt godt forstått, og 
inntektsmålene kan konstrueres slik at konsekvensene av målefeil avhjelpes. Dette er imidlertid ikke 
nødvendigvis tilfelle når man studerer overføring av kjennetegn mellom flere generasjoner. 
 
I denne artikkelen viser vi hvordan målefeil kan bidra til over-estimering av persistens i økonomiske 
kjennetegn over tre generasjoner, altså mellom besteforeldre, foreldre og barnebarn. Ved hjelp av 
simuleringer viser vi at det kan være målefeil i OLS-estimater (estimater basert på minste kvadraters 
metode) selv ved bruk av 30-års gjennomsnitt som inntektsmål og at dette gir en kunstig høy 
koeffisient på bestefars inntekt i en intergenerasjonell inntektsregresjon. Vi bruker også en 
fremgangsmåte med instrumentvariable (IV) som unngår denne typen målefeil. 
 
Ved hjelp av norske registerdata finner vi overføring av målefeil (spillover bias) i estimatet på 
bestefars innflytelse, og kombinasjonen av resultater fra OLS- og IV-estimater peker i retning av at et 
positivt OLS-estimat på besteforeldregenerasjonen kan være for høyt estimert. 
 
1 Introduction
Measurement error in a regressor is often acknowledged in empirical studies, but the focus tends
to be only on potential error in the variable of interest and resulting biases in the corresponding
coeﬃcient. In reality, there is often measurement error in other regressors and this can cause
bias in the coeﬃcient of interest. Although the notion of bias in one coeﬃcient arising from error
in another regressor is a well-known econometric result, it is seldom addressed in practice with
empirical studies.
The emerging multigenerational income mobility literature is a recent exception. The regression
of interest uses oﬀspring income as the dependent variable, with parent income and grandparent
income as two regressors. In this case, the focus is generally on the coeﬃcient on grandparent
income, where a positive coeﬃcient implies lower mobility levels; in a sense, the parental income
measure is a “control” variable. Solon (2018) noted that due to the econometric result just de-
scribed, measurement error in parental income could explain a small positive coeﬃcient estimate
on grandparents’ income.
Our contribution to this literature is to formally show with theory, simulations, and adminis-
trative data the role that measurement error may play in the grandparent coeﬃcient estimates.
We consider well known income measurement issues and characterize their distinct implications
for the multigenerational income mobility estimates, in particular highlighting how small positive
grandparent coeﬃcient estimates could be inﬂated, and may be a consequence of measurement er-
ror. First, we note that settings with lower intergenerational mobility (i.e., larger intergenerational
persistence parameters) are more susceptible to this bias, due to two parameters underlying the
spillover bias factor: the (parent-grandparent) correlation between the regressors, and the parent-
child regression parameter. Second, our simulations show that even using long-term averages of
income during midlife for all three generations will not eliminate the possibility of estimating a
spurious grandparent coeﬃcient. Third, we also show a counter-intuitive result that, for a given
parental income measure (e.g., a 20-year average), improving the grandparent income measure ac-
tually inﬂates the spillover bias in the grandparent coeﬃcient, which would otherwise incorrectly
be interpreted as reducing attenuation bias. Additionally, we propose an IV approach that has
the advantage of requiring a shorter timespan of incomes to minimize bias, and serves as a useful
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supplemental approach for gauging bias.
We also use administrative tax data from Norway to provide an empirical illustration of the
bias spillover in the OLS and IV estimates, showing how it inﬂates the grandparent coeﬃcient
in the multigenerational regression. Our empirical results are consistent with the patterns in our
simulation results, and our preferred estimates of the grandparent coeﬃcient using methods to
mitigate bias are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. So although we ﬁnd small positive
coeﬃcient estimates, we cannot rule out the possibility these are spurious. Further considering that
we have very good administrative data, which is not susceptible to some important sources of error
present in survey data, our empirical results can be considered an understatement of the potential
biases.
More broadly, this paper contributes to the empirical literature as a cautionary note to remain
cognizant of measurement error in regressors other than the variable of interest. Our explicit
derivations and thus simulation use some assumptions speciﬁc to multigenerational mobility, but
many of the results could apply also in other settings. For instance, the larger the correlation
between the error-ridden regressor and the variable of interest, the larger the magnitude of the
spillover bias. In fact, this correlation may be the actual motivation for including the control
variable, if one believes the control is highly correlated with our variable of interest and would
cause bias if omitted. Further, given that our measurement characterizations are based on income
dynamics, a natural extension is to studies that control for a measure of individual or family income
(e.g., the child health or early childhood schooling literatures).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide background on
the intergenerational and multigenerational income mobility literatures. Then we formalize the
biases from measurement issues in Section 3, both summarizing the existing results on biases in
the intergenerational (parent-child) literature as well as extending these to the multigenerational
setting. We use these theoretical results to run a simple simulation in Section 4, which illustrates
the nature of these biases in the multigenerational estimates. Section 5 describes our administrative
data and approach, followed by the empirical results. We provide conclusions in Section 6.
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2 Background
Societies throughout the world are concerned with the persistence of poverty (or privilege) across
generations, and there is a large descriptive literature examining the extent to which this intergen-
erational transmission of socioeconomic status occurs.1 Estimating a basic model,
yi0 = β1xi1 + i, (1)
where yi0 is an outcome for a child in family i and xi1 the same outcome for the parent, gives an
estimate of the summary statistic, β1, describing associations across generations.
2 Although this
provides a useful description of mobility, researchers are now attempting to explore whether there
is more to the process—i.e., additional generations—that we should add to our general depiction
of mobility. To paint a more complete picture one can add another generation to equation (1),
estimating:
yi0 = γ1xi1 + γ2xi2 + i (2)
In this case, γ1 still describes transmission from parents (though now conditional on grandparents)
and γ2 describes the persistence from grandparents to their grandchildren, conditional on parents.
Even a small positive γ2 can have important implications for mobility, indicating slower mobility
than implied by equation (1). For example, Lindahl et al. (2015) ﬁnd positive estimates of γ2 using
survey data on income and education in Malmo¨, Sweden, and conclude that “estimates obtained
from data on two generations severely underestimate long-run intergenerational persistence in both
labor earnings and educational attainments.”3
To see this, note that if the model in (1) represents the true underlying transmission process,
1See Solon (1999) and Black & Devereux (2011) for thorough reviews of the literature on two-generation mobility.
2Intercepts are omitted to simplify presentation; the variables should be considered to be in deviation-from-mean
form.
3Several other recent studies also ﬁnd evidence of a small positive grandparent eﬀect. Lindahl et al. (2014) use
the same survey data from Malmo¨, Sweden; Hertel & Groh-Samberg (2014) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) to study persistence in occupational class in the U.S.; Modalsli (2016) uses administrative data on occupations
and incomes for Norway; Long & Ferrie (2018) use wealth-based occupational status measures constructed from U.S.
Census data; Boserup et al. (2014) estimate multigenerational wealth elasticities using Danish administrative records;
Pfeﬀer (2014) uses the PSID to study educational mobility in the U.S.; Ferrie et al. (2016) further explore educational
mobility in the U.S. using Census data, and Ferrie et al. (2016) consider the possibility that their estimate could be
a consequence of measurement error.
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then we could use our estimates of β1 to approximate the association for further generations. For
example, under simplifying assumptions, the persistence between the outcomes for children and
their grandparents could be approximated by β21 . This approximation implies that persistence
declines geometrically, so we would observe fairly rapid mobility across generations.4 However,
several recent multigenerational mobility studies ﬁnd a positive grandparental coeﬃcient in (2)
(e.g., Clark, 2014; Clark & Cummins, 2015; Long & Ferrie, 2018; Lindahl et al., 2015; Zeng & Xie,
2014; Ha¨llsten, 2014; Olivetti et al., 2014; Modalsli, 2016), which implies a slower than geometric
rate of decline in persistence, or lower mobility.5 For a numerical example, consider Norway,
where the true β1 may be around 0.4.
6 In a regression where log income is the outcome (so β1 is an
intergenerational income elasticity), a child whose parents have income 50% above the mean in their
generation would be expected to have income around 20% above the mean in the child’s generation.
Conversely, if the grandparents had income, say, 75% above the mean in their generation, and γ2
is about 0.1 (assuming γ1 is 0.4), would imply the child’s income would be about 27.5% above the
mean.
Recent multigenerational studies use a variety of outcomes, such as education, occupation, or
wealth, and a few have used data on individual’s income.7 Lindahl et al. (2014, 2015) estimate
unconditional and conditional (on parents) eﬀects of grandparents for income and education in
Malmo¨, Sweden, ﬁnding positive eﬀects of grandparents for both outcomes. Modalsli (2016) uses
administrative data on occupations and incomes for Norway, ﬁnding that grandparents do matter
conditional on parents. Long & Ferrie (2018) use income-based occupational status measures in
historical censuses for Britain, also ﬁnding positive estimates of the grandparent coeﬃcient.
A true small positive grandparent eﬀect is certainly plausible, with a number of possible un-
derlying mechanisms, ranging from biological to social inﬂuences or simply through resources.8
4See Stuhler (2014) for further discussion of this approximation.
5Early studies did not ﬁnd strong evidence of a conditional grandparent eﬀect, but these datasets were often for
a peculiar or non-representative sample (e.g., Warren & Hauser (1997), Hodge (1966) ).
6Nilsen et al. (2012) ﬁnd an estimate of 0.34 based on measuring income with a 15-year average, implying a
potential attenuation factor of about 0.85 from Mazumder (2005); this implies β1 = 0.42.
7Hertel & Groh-Samberg (2014) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study persistence in oc-
cupational class in the U.S.; Long & Ferrie (2018) use wealth-based occupational status measures constructed from
U.S. Census data; Boserup et al. (2014) estimate multigenerational wealth elasticities using Danish administrative
records; Pfeﬀer (2014) uses the PSID to study educational mobility in the U.S.; Ferrie et al. (2016) further explore
educational mobility in the U.S. using Census data. All of these studies ﬁnd evidence of a small positive grandparent
eﬀect, and Ferrie et al. (2016) consider the possibility that their estimate could be a consequence of measurement
error.
8The seminal theoretical work by Becker & Tomes (1979) arrives at the perhaps counter intuitive prediction of
7
Grandparents may have frequent interactions with grandchildren due to close geographic proxim-
ity, or have labor market connections from which the child may beneﬁt, or they may make direct
ﬁnancial investments on behalf of the child (in a manner distinctive to how the parents would
choose). Of course, identifying mechanisms is always challenging, whether considering the inter-
generational or multigenerational settings. And, while we by no means wish to decry the potential
for these mechanisms to cause a positive grandparent coeﬃcient, it is important to recognize the
limitations of our empirical estimates given the data available to us.
3 Biases from income measurement issues
Measurement issues have long played an important role in the descriptive mobility literature, and
have received particular attention in the context of income mobility (e.g., Solon, 1992; Zimmerman,
1992; Mazumder, 2005; Haider & Solon, 2006; Nybom & Stuhler, 2014). The measurement issues
stem from the fact that, although we would like to estimate the intergenerational persistence in a
long-term (or lifetime) component of income, we do not observe this. Instead we rely on observed
annual incomes, either from self-reported survey data or administrative records. The sources of bias
that can arise from using such measures include transitory ﬂuctuations in annual income (which we
will consider to implicitly include any measurement error in annual reports) and lifecycle variation
in both the relationship between permanent and annual incomes as well as in the share of annual
income variation due to the transitory components.9 With these issues, the timing and duration of
the lifespan for which we observe annual incomes are crucial to mitigating potential biases.
We begin this section by reviewing results from the existing literature on resulting biases in
OLS and IV estimation of the intergenerational regression in equation (1). In Section 3.2, we then
brieﬂy note how these biases might aﬀect extrapolations of the intergenerational coeﬃcients to
make inferences regarding multigenerational mobility. We turn to multigenerational regressions in
a negative eﬀect of grandparents conditional on parent income, which implies persistence declines at a faster than
geometric rate, or more rapid mobility. The intuition behind a negative coeﬃcient is that if the increased income of
grandparents did not raise the parents’ income, this implies the parent got a poor draw on human capital endowment,
and some of this is passed on to the child. Solon (2014) and Stuhler (2014) also adapt this theoretical framework,
providing further discussion of how and why we might ﬁnd a conditional grandparental eﬀect, whether negative or
positive.
9For studies relying on retrospective questions in surveys (about own income in previous periods or about parents’
economic status a generation back) the possibility of recall error introduces yet another bias. This will not be directly
addressed here, as an increasing number of studies (including the present one) rely on administrative data that is
collected during or shortly after the year the income is accrued.
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Section 3.3, showing how the income measurement issues play out in OLS and IV estimation of
equation (2).
3.1 Biases in the intergenerational regression
Measurement error (or transitory ﬂuctuations) in annual income along with the life-cycle proﬁle
in income are two well documented sources of bias in intergenerational mobility studies, both of
which can be mitigated with how income is measured. Measuring income during mid-life minimizes
bias from the latter (Haider & Solon, 2006; Nybom & Stuhler, 2014). When income is measured
in this timespan, averaging over several years of income has been shown to substantially reduce
attenuation bias from measurement error or transitory ﬂuctuations (Solon, 1992; Mazumder, 2005).
We begin our summary with the simple case of classical measurement error and no lifecycle
eﬀects, where parental log annual income in year t, x1t, is decomposed into a permanent component
x1 and a white noise error or transitory component, v1t:
xi1t = xi1 + vi1t (3)
In this case, we know that the OLS estimate of β1 is attenuated:
plim(βˆ1,OLS) = β1
σ2x1
σ2x1 + σ
2
v1
, (4)
where σ2x1 = var(xi1) and σ
2
v1 = var(vi1t). Taking the average over T years of log income reduces
the attenuation bias because σ2v1 is then replaced by σ
2
v1 /T in (4). Note that in this simple setting,
taking averages over several years for oﬀspring income (the dependent variable yi0) reduces the
error variance.
Under the strong assumptions of classical measurement error, instrumental variables estimation
(IV) (with a valid instrument) provides consistent estimates of β1. Early intergenerational studies
use fathers’ education to instrument for fathers’ income (e.g., Solon, 1992) as well as annual income
to instrument for multi-year averages (Altonji & Dunn, 1991), though both studies acknowledge
the tenuousness of instrument exogeneity. In the latter approach, a valid instrument can only
aﬀect oﬀspring income through the permanent component of the parental income average (so the
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transitory components cannot be correlated over time). Altonji & Dunn (1991) note that this
may not hold because their IV estimates are consistent with some persistence in the transitory
component of income.
Mazumder (2005) subsequently shows that such persistence implies worse attenuation bias even
when time-averaging with OLS estimation. Suppose the transitory component, vi1t, follows an
AR(1) process with persistence parameter δ:
vi1t = δvi1t−1 + ei1t. (5)
Then the OLS estimate converges to:10
plim(βˆ1,OLS) = β1
σ2x1
σ2x1 +
1
T
(
σ2e1
1−δ2
)
φ
, (6)
where
φ = 1 + 2δ
T − 1−δT1−δ
T (1− δ) . (7)
In this case, the attenuation bias is not reduced to the same extent by taking multi-year averages
(since 0 > δ > 1), and an IV approach using an annual income measure in year s to instrument
for income in year t (or an average ending in year t) no longer provides a consistent estimate,
though the bias shrinks as s gets further from t. Deﬁning T = s− t, the probability limit of the IV
estimator is:
plim(βˆ1,IV ) = β1
σ2x1
σ2x1 + δ
T σ
2
e1
1−δ2
. (8)
Further complicating things is the lifecycle variation in the size of σ2v1, which has been found to
be U-shaped with the smallest level being in the early 40s (e.g., Mazumder, 2001, 2005).11 When
taking longer term averages of annual income, σ2v/T can potentially get larger if σ
2
v1t grows fast
enough, thus exacerbating attenuation bias rather than reducing it.
Other studies have pointed out that the relationship between annual incomes and permanent
10Solon (1992) originally noted this more complicated probability limit in footnote 17 of his paper, and Mazumder
(2005) subsequently examined the empirical implications.
11For Norway, Nilsen et al. (2012) do not ﬁnd the full U-shape pattern found for other countries, rather they ﬁnd
the typical incline beginning in the early 40’s, but with a stable level at younger ages. We discuss the implications of
this further with our empirical results.
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income changes over the lifecycle, and this can lead to attenuation or ampliﬁcation bias (e.g., Haider
& Solon, 2006). To model this lifecycle variation, equation (3) becomes xi1t = λ1txi1 + vi1t. λ1t
tends to be less than one at younger ages, reaches one around the early 40s when annual income
is a reasonable measure of average lifetime income, and then is greater than one at older ages.
Incorporating λ1t leads to
plim(βˆ1,OLS) = β1
λ1tσ
2
x1
λ21tσ
2
x1 + σ
2
v1
(9)
for OLS estimates from using an annual income measure for parents. If an annual measure is used
for oﬀspring as well, plim(βˆ1) in (9) is multiplied by λ0τ (the analogous parameter relating annual
income in year τ to permanent income for oﬀspring). When a T-year average of income is used,
again σ2v1 is replaced by σ
2
v1/T and λ1t is replaced by the average over the included years, λ¯1T .
And, in the case of IV using an annual income to instrument for another, plim(βˆ1) simpliﬁes to
β1
λ0τ
λ1t
.
So for OLS and IV, the lifecycle related bias can be attenuating or amplifying in nature, as
shown by studies emphasizing the importance of measuring annual incomes during the age ranges
for which λ1t and λ0τ (or λ¯1T ) are approximately 1 (Haider & Solon, 2006; Nybom & Stuhler,
2014).
Many of the aforementioned intergenerational results have been documented in the literature
(e.g., Solon, 1992; Zimmerman, 1992; Mazumder, 2001, 2005; Haider & Solon, 2006; Nilsen et al.,
2012; Nybom & Stuhler, 2014). And some of these methods for mitigating bias, such as measuring
income at midlife and averaging over several years, have become standard practice. However, even
when these practices are implemented, some bias still remains. In the two-generation setting, this
may not be very problematic because it is generally believed that we know the direction of bias and
often it is fairly small in magnitude. Still, we note in the next section that using these estimates
to make inferences about multigenerational mobility could be misleading if we ignore the leftover
bias.
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3.2 Comparing estimates from two-generation regressions
As previously mentioned, studies sometimes extrapolate intergenerational regression estimates to
approximate multigenerational mobility, and the above noted biases could lead to false conclusions
of a grandparent eﬀect. For instance, some studies compare estimates of the oﬀspring-grandparent
association (β3) with (βˆ1)
2. If βˆ3 > (βˆ1)
2, this has been interpreted as evidence in favor of a
grandparent eﬀect (e.g., Lindahl et al., 2015; Long & Ferrie, 2018). If we consider the results above
on attenuation bias, it is not clear that comparing βˆ3 and (βˆ1)
2 is strong enough evidence, even
after properly accounting for estimation error, because of the attenuation bias that is present in
the estimates. Deﬁne these attenuation factors θ∗1 and θ∗3 such that βˆ1 = θ∗1β1 and βˆ3 = θ∗3β3. Then
it is simple to show that even if β3 = (β1)
2, we would ﬁnd that βˆ3 > (βˆ1)
2 when the attenuation
factors satisfy θ∗3 > (θ∗1)2. How likely is this to occur? Using the preferred estimates of attenuation
factors in Table 1 of Mazumder (2005), if we use a 10-year average for parents’ income (θ∗1 = 0.79
so (θ∗1)2 = 0.62), then a 4-year (or longer) average (θ∗3 = 0.66) for grandparents’ income can give
θ∗3 > (θ∗1)2, and thus βˆ3 > (βˆ1)2.
Another analogous comparison studies consider is whether βˆ3 > βˆ1βˆ2, where βˆ2 is an estimate
of the parent-grandparent association (e.g., Lindahl et al., 2015; Adermon et al., 2018). In this
case, if we again consider attenuation bias, we will mistakenly conclude that βˆ3 > βˆ1βˆ2 (despite
the true relationship being β3 = β1β2) if the attenuation factors satisfy θ
∗
3 > θ
∗
1θ
∗
2. Since the same
grandparent income measure is typically used in the oﬀspring-grandparent and parent-grandparent
regressions, θ∗3 = θ∗2, meaning any θ∗1 < 1 can lead us to mistakenly conclude that βˆ3 > βˆ1βˆ2.
Although the biases can be complicated by lifecycle eﬀects as discussed above, if income is measured
during midlife so λ¯t ≈ 1, then it is almost certain that θ∗1 < 1 for any long-term average of income;
even using a 30-year average leaves an attenuation factor of 0.91 in the simulations in Mazumder
(2005).
Although it is feasible that biases may aﬀect the comparisons of intergenerational estimates,
these comparisons were generally made due to data limitations. Now that it is possible to run the
full multigenerational regression, we show in the next section that this presents unique challenges
even with small amounts of bias remaining from parental income measures, as this bias spills over
into—and has the opposite eﬀect on—the grandparent coeﬃcient in equation (2).
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3.3 Biases in the multigenerational regression
We next turn to the multigenerational regression, showing the distinct implications of the measure-
ment issues discussed above, including the consequences from bias that remains even after taking
standard approaches to mitigate the measurement issues. The intergenerational correlation between
parents’ and grandparents’ permanent components of income leads to spillover of these biases, a
standard econometric result. Such spillover is often ignored because the aﬀected coeﬃcient is not
for a variable of interest, but the opposite is true in this case—we are primarily interested in the
grandparent coeﬃcient. Notably, this spillover bias can produce a small positive coeﬃcient esti-
mate when the true parameter for grandparents is zero—or even negative—in the multigenerational
equation in (2).
For intuition, ﬁrst consider the simple setting where only parental income is measured with
error and the measurement error is classical, but we perfectly observe grandparents’ income (xi2).
Then the coeﬃcient estimate on parents’ income is attenuated, but the coeﬃcient estimate on
grandparents’ income is actually biased upward because the underlying permanent component of
parents’ earnings is positively related to that of the grandparents.
To see the potential eﬀects of bias spillover more precisely, we extend the simple scenario
of classical measurement error to both generations. Consider annual income measures for both
generations that follow equation (3), where now it also matters that vi1t is orthogonal to vi2t, so
annual income is only related across generations through the permanent component of income. This
is reﬂected below by ρ = corr(xi1, xi2), which is the intergenerational correlation in the permanent
component of income between the parent and grandparent generations. For simplicity, consider
the case of stationarity where var(xi1t) = var(xi2t) = σ
2
x and var(vi1t) = var(vi2t) = σ
2
v . The
probability limits of the OLS estimators from using annual income measures in the multigenerational
equation (2) are:
13
plim(γˆ1,OLS) = γ1
σ2x
σ2x + σ
2
v
(
σ2x+σ
2
v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
attenuation, θ1
+γ2
σ2x
(
ρσ2v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
σ2x + σ
2
v
(
σ2x+σ
2
v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
spillover, ω1
(10a)
plim(γˆ2,OLS) = γ1
σ2x
(
ρσ2v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
σ2x + σ
2
v
(
σ2x+σ
2
v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
spillover, ω2
+γ2
σ2x
σ2x + σ
2
v
(
σ2x+σ
2
v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
attenuation, θ2
(10b)
The probability limit for each generation’s coeﬃcient is decomposed into a linear combination
of the respective true parameter times an attenuation factor (θ), plus the other generation’s true
parameter times a spillover factor (ω). In a perfect world with no measurement error, and hence
no bias, both attenuation factors would be equal to one, and both spillover factors would be equal
to zero.
With measurement error, these equations show that even if grandparents do not have an eﬀect
on grandchildren’s income conditional on parents—so γ2 = 0 in equation (2)—although the second
element of the plim(γˆ2,OLS) sum will be zero, the ﬁrst element (γ1ω2) will still be positive. Hence,
despite the true γ2 = 0, one would still estimate a small positive coeﬃcient. Even with the common
practice of using multi-year averages of income, where then the σ2v in equations (10a) and (10b) are
replaced by (σ2v/T ), some bias still remains—and will still cause upward bias in the other coeﬃcient
estimate—leaving open the possibility of estimating a spurious grandparent eﬀect.
The size of the spillover bias in plim(γˆ2) is largely driven by the size of γ1 and is also increasing
in ρ, so we would expect it to be more substantial in countries with higher levels of intergenerational
persistence. Conversely, since we expect the grandfather coeﬃcient γ2 to be small (if it is not zero),
we do not expect spillover to be a major contributor to bias in the parental coeﬃcient estimate
γˆ1,OLS . Rather, attenuation bias will still be the primary concern, and since
(
σ2x+σ
2
v
σ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
> 1,
attenuation bias in the parental coeﬃcient will be at least slightly worse in the multigenerational
setting than it was in the intergenerational regression. In this case with stationarity, the attenuation
factors and spillover factors are the same for parents and grandparents, so ω1 = ω2 and θ1 = θ2.
In theory, these could diﬀer across generations without stationarity, and when we incorporate key
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features of more realistic earnings processes.12
Given that the equations above are based on the simple case of classical measurement error, IV
using annual income in one year to instrument for another year would yield consistent estimates of γ1
and γ2.
13 Although classical errors in variables scenario is useful for exposition and for identifying
methods to reduce bias in the intergenerational regression setting, studies recognize this is not
realistic for the actual earnings process, especially to the extent that IV using consecutive annual
incomes would provide consistent estimates. Considering the simple AR(1) process in equation (5)
to capture persistence in the transitory component of earnings for both parents and grandparents,
we replace σ2v with
σ2e
1−δ2 in the probability limits for the OLS estimators in (10a) and (10b). Or
when we use T-year averages of annual income, each σ2v is replaced with
1
T
(
σ2e
1−δ2
)
φ, where φ is
from equation (7).
Studies have shown that the transitory components are correlated over time, but generally
disappear after about 3 years.14 This means that annual earnings measures 4 or 5 (or more)
years apart can be used to instrument for each other, as it seems reasonable to assume that the
measurement errors in these years are uncorrelated with each other and are also uncorrelated with
child’s earnings. Hence, one approach we take is similar to Altonji & Dunn (1991), using parental
annual earnings from one year to instrument for parents’ earnings in a diﬀerent year, and do the
same for grandparents’ earnings. Again using T = s − t to denote the number of years between
the annual earnings measure used as an instrument (year s) and treated as endogenous (year t),
the probability limits of the IV estimators for γ1 and γ2 are identical to equations (10a) and (10b)
except that each σ2v is replaced with δ
T
(
σ2e
1−δ2
)
. As with the intergenerational case, increasing T
(years between the instrument and endogenous income measures) reduces attenuation bias.
We next turn to lifecycle related biases. The implications of age-related variation in the as-
12The probability limits from the multigenerational regression without assuming stationarity are provided in the
Appendix.
13A few multigenerational studies have used IV approaches to address measurement error, but have done so by
using the outcome for grandparents to instrument for that for parents (Boserup et al., 2014) or similarly have used
great-grandparents to instrument for grandparents (Lindahl et al., 2014). The instrument validity in these cases relies
on the assumption that the grandparents’ (great-grandparents’) outcome does not aﬀect the child’s outcome except
via the parents’ (grandparents’) outcome. Considering the theoretical mechanisms through which grandparents could
exert a direct eﬀect (after conditioning on parents), and the ﬁndings in recent research supporting such mechanisms
(e.g., Zeng & Xie, 2014), it is unclear whether this assumption holds for the case of using a grandparent outcome to
instrument for parents.
14Moﬃtt & Gottschalk (1995) use the PSID data from 1969-87 and ﬁnd that the transitory component is composed
of serially correlated shocks that die out within 3 years. Using later years of the PSID, Haider (2001) notes that less
than 15% of transitory shock remains after 3 years.
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sociation between annual and permanent income for oﬀspring is straightforward. Assuming we
observe parents’ and grandparents’ permanent income, the multiplicative bias is the same as in
the two generation regression, plim(γˆ1) = λ0τγ1 and plim(γˆ2) = λ0τγ2, so to the extent that λ0τ
is diﬀerent from 1, both coeﬃcient estimates are biased in the same direction by the same pro-
portion. However, lifecycle bias arising from measurement of parent and grandparent income is
more complicated, again leaving open the possibilities of attenuation or ampliﬁcation bias. In this
case, now assuming we observe permanent income for the oﬀspring (and still maintaining station-
arity), we distinguish between lifecycle eﬀects with λgt for each generation (g = 1, 2 for parents,
grandparents):
plim(γˆ1,OLS) = γ1
λ1tσ
2
x
λ21tσ
2
x + σ
2
v
(
λ22tσ
2
x+σ
2
v
λ22tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) + γ2 λ1tσ2x
(
ρσ2v
λ22tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
λ21tσ
2
x + σ
2
v
(
λ22tσ
2
x+σ
2
v
λ22tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) (11a)
plim(γˆ2,OLS) = γ1
λ2tσ
2
x
(
ρσ2v
λ21tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
λ22tσ
2
x + σ
2
v
(
λ21tσ
2
x+σ
2
v
λ21tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) + γ2 λ2tσ2x
λ22tσ
2
x + σ
2
v
(
λ21tσ
2
x+σ
2
v
λ21tσ
2
x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) . (11b)
When using T -year averages of income, λgt and σ
2
v are replaced with λ¯gT and σ
2
v/T , respectively.
So taking long-term averages during midlife helps to ensure that λ¯gT ≈ 1. The other source of age-
related bias is the U-shaped pattern in the size of σ2v . If the increase in σ
2
v is steep enough, then σ
2
v/T
may grow as one averages over more years, worsening attenuation bias. In the multigenerational
case, such a scenario would also lead to larger spillover bias for larger T .
For IV, the noisier earnings measures with larger σ2v also leads to larger spillover and atten-
uation factors. And when considering lifecycle changes in λgt, the probability limits are slightly
more complicated because we have to separately consider λgt for the income measure treated as
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endogenous and λgs for the income measure used as an instrument:
plim(γˆ1,IV ) = γ1
λ1sσ
2
x
λ1sλ1tσ2x + σ
2
v
(
λ2sλ2tσ2x+σ
2
v
λ2sλ2tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) + γ2 λ1sσ2x
(
ρσ2v
λ2sλ2tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
λ1sλ1tσ2x + σ
2
v
(
λ2sλ2tσ2x+σ
2
v
λ2sλ2tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) (12a)
plim(γˆ2,IV ) = γ1
λ2sσ
2
x
(
ρσ2v
λ1sλ1tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
λ2sλ2tσ2x + σ
2
v
(
λ1sλ1tσ2x+σ
2
v
λ1sλ1tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) + γ2 λ2sσ2x
λ2sλ2tσ2x + σ
2
v
(
λ1sλ1tσ2x+σ
2
v
λ1sλ1tσ2x(1−ρ2)+σ2v
) . (12b)
Although λgs appears in these equations, it is λgt (for the endogenous measure) that matters more
for lifecycle bias in IV estimates. So for both estimators it is important to measure income during
the periods of life for which λgt ≈ 1 for each generation, which we do in our empirical approach.
The implications of lifecycle bias are similar to what has been found for the intergenerational case;
measuring income at too old of ages (λgt > 1) leads to downward bias or at too young of ages
(λgt < 1) leads to ampliﬁcation bias.
Clearly all of these biases can have varying implications, none of which would be easy to see
in isolation if all were incorporated in a probability limit at once. We used simple extensions to
account for key features of the earnings process, reﬂecting the persistent nature of the transitory
component and changes over the lifecycle, presenting them separately in sets of equations above.
Still, even without incorporating the more complicated models used for realistic earnings processes,
the probability limits do not readily exhibit implications of all measurement issues for the bias
factors. Hence, we further discuss the implications of the measurement issues in the next section,
where we perform simulations to better illustrate and quantify the consequences of these biases in
diﬀerent scenarios.
4 Simulation
To quantify the implications of these biases in multigenerational regressions, we conduct simple
simulations based on equations (10a)-(12b). We vary the parameters ρ, δ, and λgt to gauge the
extent of these biases in a variety of plausible data generating scenarios, and assess the likelihood
of estimating a spurious grandparent coeﬃcient. Recall, ρ is the correlation in the permanent
component of income, xig, across generations and hence reﬂects diﬀerent levels of intergenerational
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persistence in diﬀerent societies. The parameters δ and λ determine underlying earnings dynamics.
δ is the autocorrelation coeﬃcient in the transitory component of earnings (so a value of zero
corresponds to classical errors in variables), and is an important factor determining the eﬀectiveness
of using time-averaging or IV estimation to reduce attenuation bias. λgt reﬂects lifecycle variation
in the association between lifetime and annual income in year t for generation g.
As above, we maintain stationarity. And similar to Mazumder (2005), we multiply through
the above probability limits by the total variance of annual earnings, σ2xt, so that we only need to
make assumptions about the variance shares σ
2
v
σ2xt
and σ
2
x
σ2xt
to calculate the attenuation and spillover
factors (θ and ω).15
4.1 Illustrating attenuation and spillover bias
We consider several diﬀerent scenarios, varying δ (0.3, 0.5, 0.7), ρ (0.2, 0.4, 0.6), and λgt (0.8, 1,
1.2). We set the variance shares at σ
2
v
σ2xt
= σ
2
x
σ2xt
= 0.5 for our base case, but also set σ
2
v
σ2xt
= 0.7 for
a robustness check. For a given set of these parameters, we vary the number of years over which
income is averaged for parents (T1) and grandparents (T2) for OLS, or similarly, the number of
years between the endogenous and instrument earnings measures for IV. We present results for a
subset of these scenarios for pedagogical purposes, focusing on biases in the grandparent coeﬃcient
and considering a base case with ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5, and all λgt = 1. This base case is in the middle
columns of Figures 1 (OLS) and Figure 2 (IV), where each dotted line corresponds to a diﬀerent
T2 (changing the grandparent income measure), and moving along one of these dotted lines from
left to right corresponds to increasing T1 (improving the parental income measure).
Figure 1 shows the bias factors in the OLS estimate of the grandparent coeﬃcient when we use
time-averages of income. If no bias were present, the attenuation factor (θ2) would equal one and
the spillover factor (ω2) would equal zero. For our base case of ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5, time-averaging
reduces attenuation bias from about 52% (θ2=0.48) when using annual income (T2 = 1) to about
10% (θ2=0.90) with a 30-year average (T2 = 30). The set of graphs in the top row of Figure 1 shows
the calculated attenuation coeﬃcient for grandparents (θ2) for diﬀerent values of δ. On the left, we
can see that a smaller δ (0.3) implies that time-averaging is more eﬀective at reducing attenuation
bias, a result that has already been shown for intergenerational regressions (Mazumder, 2005).
15Also following Mazumder (2005), we assume σ2e adjusts so that σ
2
v =
σ2e
1−δ2 holds.
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Figure 1: Attenuation (θ2) and spillover (ω2) bias in OLS coeﬃcient for grandparent
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Similarly, the graph on the right shows that a larger δ means time averaging is less eﬀective. In all
cases, as we improve grandparents’ income measure (moving from one dotted line to another), the
attenuation factor is reduced. Improving the parental income measure by increasing T1 (moving
from left to right along each dotted line), does not help reduce attenuation bias in the grandparent
coeﬃcient. The intergenerational correlation, ρ, also has little impact on the attenuation bias, so
we do not show the attenuation coeﬃcients with diﬀerent ρ here, though these results are available
upon request.
The issue of spillover bias in the grandparent coeﬃcient, however, is present because of ρ. For
our base case of ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5, time-averaging reduces the spillover coeﬃcient from about 10%
(ω2=0.1) when using annual incomes for both generations to about 4% (ω2=0.04) with a 30-year
average for each generation. We know ρ > 0 from the substantial body of evidence on parent-child
mobility in many countries. The size of ρ, along with the parent coeﬃcient γ1, determine the size
of the overall spillover bias. 16 As shown in the bottom row of Figure 1, when ρ is small (0.2), the
16Although ρ and γ1 are closely related and we expect them to generally follow similar patterns across countries,
there are a few diﬀerences in what is captured in each. ρ reﬂects intergenerational transmission between the parent and
grandparent generations and abstracts from changes in income inequality. γ1, on the other hand, reﬂects transmission
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spillover coeﬃcient ω2 is also somewhat small. When we triple ρ to 0.6 the extent of spillover also
approximately triples for shorter-term averages of parent income (i.e, small T1). This combined
with the fact that γ1 is also likely larger for countries with large ρ implies that OLS estimates for
such societies are more susceptible to spurious grandparent eﬀects.
There are also other important patterns to note. First, for a given parental income measure,
attempting to reduce potential attenuation bias in the grandparent coeﬃcient by including more
years in the average income measure for grandparents actually worsens the spillover bias. In ω2,
time-averaging for the grandparent implies replacing the only σ2v outside of parenthesis by σ
2
v/T2,
which eﬀectively shrinks the denominator thereby increasing ω2. (This can be seen explicitly in the
more detailed probability limits in the Appendix.) So if the true γ2 = 0, there is no attenuation to
be concerned about, and the time-averaging for grandparents is actually creating a spurious small
positive grandparent coeﬃcient. This is illustrated below in Figure 3(b). Second, in countries with
large ρ it takes far more years of observed income for parents to eliminate/mitigate the spillover bias.
When ρ = 0.6, for example, even using 30-year averages of income for parents and grandparents—
which is not yet possible in any datasets we know of—the spillover bias is not eliminated.
Although this can be problematic for OLS estimation, there are more promising results for
relatively small T with IV estimation. Figure 2 presents the computed attenuation (θ2) and spillover
(ω2) factors for IV estimation using an individual’s annual income measure in year s to instrument
for that individual’s income in year t. In the ﬁgures, Tg indicates the diﬀerence in years (s-t)
between the instrument and endogenous measure for parents (g = 1) and grandparents (g = 2).
First, although attenuation bias is again worse the larger δ is, it can be nearly eliminated using
income measures in a relatively short time period (up to about 10 years with high δ). When
T1 = T2 = 1, the attenuation factor θ2 is about 0.65, and reaches about 0.99 at T1 = T2 = 6.
Second, the spillover bias is only slightly smaller than OLS with very small Tg, at about 0.1, but
is nearly eliminated with only about a 6-year timespan of income for parents and grandparents,
giving ω2 < 0.01. Although the spillover is again worse with larger ρ, it is still eliminated with
relatively short timespans of income.
These simulation results are enlightening for multigenerational regressions, but have abstracted
between the child and parent generations, conditional on parents. And, changes in income inequality from the
grandparent to parent generation would be reﬂected in γ1.
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Figure 2: Attenuation (θ2) and spillover (ω2) bias in IV coeﬃcient for grandparent
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from the two age-related sources of bias: the lifecycle variation in σ2v and in the association between
annual and lifetime income (λgt). The implications of the former are fairly straightforward. A larger
transitory variance share means a noisier income measure, so for each Tg, the attenuation factor is
smaller (meaning worse attenuation bias). The spillover factor tends to be similar for small T, but
then greater for large T. For example, if we make the transitory variation more important and set
σ2v
σ2xt
= 0.7 so σ
2
x
σ2xt
= 0.3, then time-averaging over 30 years for OLS only reduces the attenuation bias
to 20%. And the spillover factor is only reduced to 0.07 with a 30-year average income measure.
For IV, the implications are less extreme. At Tg = 6, the spillover coeﬃcient is below 0.02 and the
attenuation factor reaches 0.98.
The implications of lifecycle variation in the association between annual and lifetime income,
reﬂected by λgt, are more complicated. See Appendix Figures B.1-B.4 for analogous graphs of the
attenuation and spillover factors. The attenuation coeﬃcient for OLS follows the same patterns
found in previous studies for the intergenerational regression. When λgt > 1, as is the case for
annual incomes measured at older ages, attenuation bias is worse (θg is smaller). When income is
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measured at younger ages, so λgt < 1, θ2 can be larger than one which means there is ampliﬁcation
bias rather than attenuation.
The spillover factor (ωg) is larger when λgt < 1 and smaller when λgt > 1, reinforcing the
attenuation or ampliﬁcation bias from θg. Considering the combined implications of the lifecycle
eﬀects on θg and ωg, the OLS coeﬃcient estimates of γg are possibly biased upward when λgt < 1
and likely biased downward when λgt > 1. Standard practice is to measure income at ages when
λgt ≈ 1, but taking long-term averages of income can extend into age ranges where λgt = 1. Still,
extending ages symmetrically in both directions leads to a greater likelihood that λ¯gT remains
around one.
With IV estimation, it is the age at which the endogenous earnings is measured that drives
lifecycle bias. If λgt < 1, this can result in substantial ampliﬁcation bias even after increasing Tg,
while λgt > 1 exacerbates attenuation bias. A simple way to test for this source of lifecycle bias in
IV estimates—and potentially bound the true coeﬃcient—is to do IV estimation twice, where the
instrument and endogenous measures are reversed.
We focused most of our discussion here on the biases in the grandparent coeﬃcient, which is
of primary interest here. The analogous results for θ1 and ω1 for parents are the same by design
(available upon request). However, the extent to which the spillover (ω1) bias aﬀects the magnitude
of our coeﬃcient estimate depends on the size of γ2. Since this is presumably small relative to γ1,
spillover bias will not generally be problematic for the parent coeﬃcient, so changing T2 does not
have appreciable impacts on our estimate of γ1. Rather, addressing the attenuation bias is the
main issue, as is customary with intergenerational income regressions.
4.2 Illustrating a spurious grandfather coeﬃcient
To illustrate the consequences of the biases in Figures 1 and 2 for the actual estimates researchers
obtain, we next present ﬁgures with the corresponding coeﬃcient estimates of γ1 and γ2 for our
base case where ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5. We choose γ1 = 0.4 and γ2 = 0 to be the underlying population
parameters as these are plausible population values for our sample from Norway and reveal the
potential for a spurious grandparent coeﬃcient in this setting.
In Figure 3, the x-axis indicates the number of years used in the time-averages of income for
OLS or the diﬀerence in years between the instrument and endogenous earnings measure for IV.
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Figure 3: IV and OLS coeﬃcients when ρ = 0.4, δ = 0.5, γ1 = 0.4, γ2 = 0
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For 3(a) and 3(d), we treat the measures for parents and grandparents symmetrically so T1=T2.
The estimates in Figure 3(a) show that simultaneously averaging over more years for parents and
grandparents both reduces attenuation bias in γˆ1,OLS as well as the spillover bias in γˆ2,OLS . (We
know there is no attenuation bias in γˆ2,OLS because we set γ2 = 0.) However, even with a 25-year
average of income for parents, attenuation bias in γˆ1,OLS still remains. In 3(b), we isolate the eﬀects
of changing the grandparent measure by using what would be considered a reasonable measure for
parent’s income—a 10-year average. This illustrates the fact that improving the grandparent income
measure is causing an increase in γˆ2,OLS , a result that would typically be interpreted as reducing
attenuation bias. In our controlled setting here, we know that this is actually increasing the size of
ω2, hence increasing the size of the spurious grandparent coeﬃcient. Figure 3(c) presents estimates
from the opposite exercise, where we use a 10-year average for grandparents’ income, but vary T1
for parents. The coeﬃcient for parents increases as we reduce attenuation bias by averaging over
more years, while the coeﬃcient estimate for grandparents decreases as the spillover bias is reduced.
More generally, this illustrates how important the parental income measure is to our estimate of
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the grandparent coeﬃcient.
Turning to the IV estimates in 3(d), we see that instrumenting essentially eliminates the at-
tenuation and spillover around T = 6 years, and this holds across the other two treatments of
solely changing the income measures for parents or grandparents in 3(d) and 3(f), respectively. For
IV, using a satisfactory instrument for parents (e.g., T1 = 6) eliminates bias. In 3(f) we see that
using a “good” measure for grandparents causes worse spillover when we do not use a good enough
instrument for parents also (T1 is not large enough). When we are able to use a 6-year distance in
instrument and endogenous income for both generations though—which is feasible in some datasets
now—IV does appear to nearly eliminate bias.
While these simulation results are useful to show the nature of the biases under a known data
generating process, we now turn to our administrative data to illustrate these implications of these
biases in practice.
5 Data and empirical results
5.1 Data
For our empirical analysis we use administrative data from Norway. This data has a uniquely long
full-population coverage of tax records, making it possible to follow individual incomes annually
from 1967 onwards. We use data on labor income (pensjonsgivende inntekt, income that qualiﬁes
for the Norwegian public pension system). This includes wages and income from self employment.
The tax ﬁles include an individual identifying number that allows linkage to the Central Population
Register, which has information on family links (fathers’ and mothers’ ID) for most individuals born
in the 1940s or later.
The oﬀspring generation is comprised of men born 1974-1978, with incomes measured at ages 32-
36 (until 2015). This age range is selected to minimize lifecycle bias, while also allowing for averaging
over multiple years of annual income to reduce error variance. Fathers and paternal grandfathers
are then identiﬁed using the population register. We use a slightly higher age range (see below) for
fathers and grandfathers because of data availability and the ages are consistent with attempting
to avoid lifecycle bias based on evidence in Nilsen et al. (2012) for similar cohorts in Norway. To
avoid sample composition diﬀerences across speciﬁcations and approaches, we present results based
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on a balanced sample where all three generations meet the following income requirements.
Sons must have positive income in at least three of ﬁve years from ages 32-36. The income
measures are based on the log of annual labor income so we exclude observations with non-positive
earnings. Included in our various constructions of earnings measures for fathers and grandfathers
are averages over 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years (requiring 3 or more years of positive earnings,
although in practice there are at least 7 years of positive incomes for the longer-term averages). Our
ﬁnal analysis sample is comprised of 5,064 sons matched to their fathers and paternal grandfathers.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for this sample, along with the general population weighted
by the sample birth year distribution, as well as the unweighted population.
Population Population
Sample (weighted) (unweighted)
Men M+W Men M+W Men M+W
Mean income 371,326 318,171 357,248 304,896 356,160 303,053
Std. dev of income 178,604 162,742 216,022 191,711 217,213 191,891
N (unique individuals) 5,064 9,831 171,939 335,155 171,939 335,155
Fathers’ generation (Birth year range: 1950-1958)
Mean income 281,787 284,347 267,366 269,213
Std. dev of income 136,513 137,667 195,184 199,443
N (unique individuals) 4,673 8,451 292,288 292,288
Father’s fathers’ generation (Birth year range: 1928-1935)
Mean income 201,850 202,197 194,142 203,323
Std. dev of income 70,656 70,299 90,290 96,932
N (unique individuals) 4,455 7,790 164,825 164,825
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Sample restriction: Birth cohorts 1974-1978, with income in at
least 3 years during ages 32-36, with fathers and grandfathers fulﬁlling the income requirements
described in the text. Incomes shown are at age 34 for the index generation and at age 40 for the
father and grandfather generations. Income is CPI-adjusted (1998 NOK; 1 NOK = 0.13 USD).
Birth year ranges for fathers and grandfathers refer to the 5th and 95th percentile of the birth year
distribution.
The average labor income of sons in our sample in the year they turn 34 (during 2004-2008)
is 371,326 NOK (inﬂation adjusted to 1998). This is slightly higher than the population average
shown in the second set of columns. One possible reason for the discrepancy is the role of immigrant
background. Immigrants do in general have lower incomes than natives, and because of the strict
requirement that both fathers’ and grandfathers’ identities are known in the registers, there are
very few immigrants in our data set. The distribution of incomes (as measured by the standard
deviation) is also somewhat lower in our sample than for the full population.
25
The fathers in our sample were born in the 1950s, so the corresponding “population” information
is for all men born in the same period (weighted by the distribution of birth years in the sample),
regardless of whether they have children. The slightly lower mean income in the general population
is likely a reﬂection of the fact that lower-income men have a lower probability of starting a family.
We see a similar diﬀerence in the distribution of grandfathers, born in the late 1920s and early
1930s. The birth year distribution of grandfathers is more skewed than that of fathers; because
grandfathers have to be born after 1928 in order to be young enough to have an observed income
at age 39 (in 1967 when the income data start), we cut oﬀ a tail of older grandfathers while there is
still a tail of younger grandfathers born in the 1930s. This also means that the average father-son
age diﬀerence in our sample is likely to be lower than in the general population.
Although it would be nice to have a larger and unquestionably representative sample for Norway,
it is not necessary for one of our primary purposes in this paper—to illustrate how bias from income
measurement can inﬂate the grandparent coeﬃcient or even produce a spurious grandparent eﬀect.
For this, it is most important to maintain a balanced sample across methods to avoid sample com-
position issues driving diﬀerent patterns in our results. Additionally, we present results for males
only. The tendency to omit females (especially mothers and grandmothers) from intergenerational
income analyses arises in large part from female labor force participation patterns and the inability
to observe outcomes. In our case, given that the rationale for our methodological choices is based
on earnings processes for males, it is appropriate to focus on sons, fathers and grandfathers in our
analysis.17
5.2 Empirical approach
We estimate a series of intergenerational and multigenerational regressions to examine the inﬂuence
of grandparents on their grandchildren’s earnings, and, in particular, look at the implications of the
income measurement issues in the multigenerational model. In all models, the dependent variable
is the 5-year average of log income for sons over ages 32-36. We also include dummy variables
for the index generation’s year of birth. We begin by estimating two-generation models including
son-father regressions, father-grandfather regressions, as well as son-grandfather regressions:
17The results for samples including daughters are similar, and are discussed below (Section 5.4).
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yi0 = β1 xi1 + i (13)
yi1 = β2 xi2 + i (14)
yi0 = β3 xi2 + i (15)
From these, we obtain several estimates of father-son associations, grandfather-father associa-
tions, as well as grandfather-son associations that are not conditional on fathers’ income. Since
we are using log income (or averages of log income) as our income measures, these coeﬃcients also
have the convenient interpretation of intergenerational income elasticities (IGEs). To examine the
eﬀects of income measurement choices on our estimates, we vary the estimation method as well as
the measures we use for xi1 and xi2. We ﬁrst estimate these models using OLS with annual log
income measures, and then proceed to average over 2 - 6 years of annual log income, as well as
10, 15, 20, and 25 year averages for longer-term measures. Next, we turn to IV estimation using
annual log income measures 2 - 6 years apart as the instrument and endogenous regressors, again
extending to 10, 15, 20, and 25 years for longer time distances between incomes. While many of
the two-generation OLS results have been shown in prior studies, we use these regressions to show
consistency of our results with these and to compare them to our IV estimates as well as to our
estimates from the multigenerational regressions.
The multigenerational regression we estimate for the conditional association between grandfa-
thers’ income and their grandchild’s income is:
yi0 = γ1 xi1 + γ2 xi2 + i (16)
We vary the income measures and estimation method used for this model in the same way de-
scribed for the two-generation models. Then, to clearly illustrate the bias spillover implications
in the multigenerational regression, we also vary the income measures separately for fathers and
grandfathers as done in the simulations. First, we consider the case where we have a “good”
measure of father’s income—in our case, the 10-year average of log income—and then vary how
grandfather’s income is measured as described above, using OLS to estimate the models. Second,
we do the same exercise using the long-term average of grandfather’s log income, but varying how
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father’s income is measured.
Next we use analogous approaches with IV estimation. We ﬁrst vary the instruments from 2-6
years (and 10+ years when suﬃcient samples sizes are possible) simultaneously for both fathers
and grandfathers. Then we isolate the eﬀects of changing the grandfather IV approach by using the
6-year instrument for fathers while varying that for grandfathers. Finally we illustrate the spillover
bias in the grandfather coeﬃcient by using the 6-year instrument for grandfathers while varying
the instrument for fathers.
5.3 Main results
To examine income mobility across generations in Norway, we begin by showing results for two
generation regressions to illustrate the results of various approaches in this well known setting.
Then we turn to the multigenerational setting, which is of primary interest in this paper, to show
how the biases and methods to alleviate them play out in these models. The three-generation
results exhibit similar consequences for fathers’ coeﬃcients in the multigenerational setting, but
also show that bias spills over into the coeﬃcient for grandfathers.
For both the two- and three-generation models, we begin with the naive approach of using
OLS to estimate models with single annual income measures for fathers and grandfathers, and
then proceed to use the now standard approach of using long-term averages of income, which has
been shown to reduce attenuation bias from the transitory components. Finally, we use our IV
approaches which allow for varying degrees of persistence in the transitory component of annual
income. All results presented are based on a balanced sample of 5,064 sons matched to their fathers
and paternal grandfathers, unless otherwise noted, and use sons’ average log income over ages 32-36
as the dependent variable.
5.3.1 Two-generation regression results
Figure 4 provides OLS estimates (top panel) and IV estimates (bottom panel), along with 95%
conﬁdence intervals, from the two-generation models in equations (13) and (15). Figure 4(a) pro-
vides father-son intergenerational income elasticities, starting with the ﬁrst estimate based on using
annual log income measures for fathers, and then proceeding to the right with log income averaged
over an increasing number of years. Each of the income measures is centered around age 43, ex-
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Figure 4: OLS and IV estimates from two-generation regressions
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panding symmetrically as the number of years in the average increases. As we average over more
years of log income for fathers, we see the expected pattern of IGEs increasing (ranging from about
0.10 to 0.21). This illustrates the established result that averaging mitigates the attenuation bias
from using annual or short-term income measures as a proxy for permanent income.
One concern that remains even after taking long-term averages of log income is that this does
not eliminate bias from the persistence in the transitory component of annual income. Therefor, we
next use an IV approach using one log annual income measure to instrument for another. If there
is no persistence in vitg, this method produces consistent estimates regardless of the years serving
as the instrument or endogenous variable (assuming they are mid-life to avoid lifecycle bias). To
further allow for varying degrees of persistence, we vary how many years apart the instrument
and endogenous measure are. We use the ﬁrst annual log income measure in the corresponding
multi-year average as our instrument, and the measure T years later as our instrument. The x-
axis indexes the number of years after the “endogenous” income measure that we measure the
“instrument” income, with all being centered around age 43 to minimize lifecycle bias.
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To the extent that the transitory component is persistent over time, we expect the estimates
to increase as we proceed left to right across Figure 4(c); increasing the years between the endoge-
nous measure and instrument will reduce the attenuation bias as the correlation in the transitory
component falls over time. In general, this is what we see for the father-son persistence estimates.
The estimates range from 0.12 for the case using income only one year later as the instrument to
0.24 when using income measures 6 years apart, and 0.32 when using measures 10 years apart.
Although these estimates are substantially higher than our OLS estimates, they are less precise as
is characteristic of IV estimates, and they are comparable in magnitude to prior IGE estimates of
about 0.34 found for Norway by Nilsen et al. (2012).18
The longer term estimates are based on subsets of our main sample which contributes to the im-
precision (97.3%, 94.7%, 92.5%, 87.3%, respectively, for the 10-, 15-, 20-, and 25-year estimates).19
With these longer timespans possibly extending into ranges where λgt < 1 (as the endogenous
age decreases), the estimates around 0.4 may contain ampliﬁcation bias. Our “reverse IV” results
(using the younger age as the instrument) support this, as the estimates are substantially smaller
around 0.3, and since it is possible λgt > 1 for these estimates, they may be attenuated. Taken to-
gether, our IV and reverse IV estimates (shown in Appendix) could be considered lower and upper
bounds on the true parameter, and this range of 0.3 to 0.4 is consistent with existing evidence for
Norway.20
Figures 4(b) and 4(d) provide the analogous results for equation (15) relating sons’ income to
grandfathers’ income. We see the expected pattern of OLS estimates increasing as we average over
more annual log income measures, with the estimates ranging from 0.05 when using annual log
income to about 0.08 when using longer term averages. There is a slight decline in the estimate
based on the 25-year averages of log income to 0.07, which may arise from lifecycle eﬀects either in
the form of increasing λ¯2T or increasing σ
2
vt.
The IV estimates in Figure 4(d) exhibit a similar pattern, with estimates growing as the years
between the endogenous and instrument income measures increases from one to six years, ranging
18Modalsli (2016) found slightly lower persistence (0.14) in rank-rank intergenerational regressions, but these
estimates were based on incomes at younger ages (28-32) so the smaller estimate is expected.
19Sensitivity checks do not indicate that sample composition is driving these higher estimates.
20The results for fathers and grandfathers based on equation (14) are very similar to the father-son regressions
(results available upon request). The OLS estimates range from 0.11 to 0.21 and the IV estimates range 0.15 to 0.25
for the 1 to 6 years between income measures, and rise to 0.46 with 10 years, though this is based on a smaller sample
(N=3,262).
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from 0.07 to 0.11. The estimate based on a 10-year distance between measures is similar at 0.13,
but the sample is substantially smaller (N=3,535, 69.0%). The samples were even smaller for the
15-, 20-, and 25-year estimates so we omit these results out of concern regarding strong sample
composition eﬀects.
Overall, our results from regressions involving two generations follow the expected patterns es-
tablished in prior studies. We can also consider comparisons of the son-father and son-grandfather
estimates for implications regarding multigenerational mobility with the simple extrapolation dis-
cussed earlier, where β21 is used to approximate longer term persistence. If βˆ3 > βˆ
2
1 , researchers
take this to be evidence of slower multigenerational mobility than predicted by the simple inter-
generational model in (13). Suppose we only had data that allowed us to use 5-year averages of
income for parents and grandparents. In that case, βˆ3,OLS = 0.098 is more than twice the size
of βˆ21,OLS = 0.039. If we account for the attenuation bias in these estimates based on our simple
earnings process with δ = 0.5 and σ
2
v
σ2xt
= 0.5, so θ = 0.69), this implies the “true” parameters would
be β3,OLS = 0.098 and β
2
1,OLS = 0.039, still exhibiting a large diﬀerence. If, however, we consider
our “best” estimates (based on using 25-year average income measures), which are βˆ21,OLS = 0.046
and again accounting for the attenuation bias (θ = 0.90), this implies β21 = 0.057 and β3 = 0.072.
The much smaller diﬀerence of only 0.016 suggests mobility could be slightly slower than implied
by the model in (13), but this is a very minor diﬀerence. And, if we consider a case with more
persistence (δ = 0.8) so the attenuation factor is 0.77, then the diﬀerence is only 0.007. In our
results, comparing intergenerational estimates can be sensitive to the income measures used, and
also the assumed earnings process if we attempt to account for attenuation bias underlying the
estimates.
This is all the more reason we should also look at the multigenerational mobility estimates
from regressions involving all three generations. The extrapolation of intergenerational persistence
estimates to make inferences about long-term mobility stemmed from data limitations, and com-
paring our intergenerational estimates does not allow us to conclusively say whether the mobility
predicted by the traditional intergenerational model understates persistence. We next turn to the
actual multigenerational regressions that have become the focus of current studies, as they are
becoming feasible with some datasets.
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5.3.2 Three-generation regression results
Figure 5: OLS and IV estimates from three-generation regressions
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We now turn to the multigenerational regression results. First, we conduct the same exercise
as in Figure 4, where we take averages of log income, increasing the number of years that we
average over symmetrically for fathers’ and grandfathers’ income. However, it is less clear now
what we should expect for the grandfather coeﬃcients because there are two competing biases.
There is attenuation bias from measurement error in “own” income, yet there is an upward bias
from measurement error in fathers’ income. In our simulation, we found that the reduction in
the attenuation factor (θ) from improving one’s own income measure was more meaningful than
the reduction in the spillover factor (ω) from improving the other generation’s income measure.
Empirically, as shown in Figure 5, the attenuation bias decreases in the coeﬃcient on fathers’
income, as the coeﬃcient estimate increases from about 0.09 to 0.21 as we average over more years.
These estimates are also similar to what we found for the father-son regression results. But the
coeﬃcient on grandfathers’ income ﬂuctuates around 0.04-0.05, when going from annual measures
to averaging over 15 years of income. The point estimates decrease slightly to 0.03 and 0.02 for the
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20- and 25-year measures, and neither of these is statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Given the strong similarity between the father coeﬃcient estimates for the three generation mod-
els to the analogous estimates from the father-son models—for both the OLS and IV estimates—it
appears that there is little or no spillover bias in the father coeﬃcients from the measurement error
in the grandfather income measures. This is also consistent with a very small (or zero) grandfather
coeﬃcient in the population. To disentangle the two sources of bias (attenuation from own income
measure versus ampliﬁcation from the other generation’s income measure), we next present results
where we change only one generation’s income measure at a time.
We ﬁrst use a “good” measure of father’s income (10-year average) throughout all models, while
changing grandfathers’ income measure as before. This allows us to isolate the eﬀect of changing the
grandfather income measure on the coeﬃcient estimate for fathers. The OLS coeﬃcient estimate
for fathers remains essentially constant though at 0.17 as we go from using annual income to longer-
term averages for grandfathers income, indicating no spillover bias in the coeﬃcient estimate for
fathers, which again is consistent with the true γ2 being zero (or very small).
Comparing these OLS results in 5(b) to the results in 5(a) where we simultaneously improve
fathers’ income measures, we can also conﬁrm that spillover bias is present in the grandfather
coeﬃcient estimate. First, note that the estimates in 5(b) for using the 10-year average (so T2 = 10
also) are identical to the 10-year average results in 5(a) by construction. Then focusing on Tg < 10,
we see the grandfather coeﬃcient estimates are larger when T1 also varied from 1 to 10 compared to
when the 10-year average is used for fathers throughout. This implies the spillover bias from using
the worse income measure for fathers (T1 < 10) led to a larger grandfather coeﬃcient estimate in
5(a). Next we see the grandfather coeﬃcient estimates for Tg > 10 are consistent with this as well,
as they are smaller than when the better income measures ( i.e., longer term averages) were also
used for fathers in 5(a). This is clear evidence of spillover bias, and also shows that even using a
10-year average to measure income for fathers is not suﬃcient to rule out spillover bias causing a
spurious positive grandfather coeﬃcient.
Finally, this exercise of changing the grandfather measure while holding the father measure
constant is also consistent with the counter-intuitive result we found with our simulation. The
pattern of increasing grandfather coeﬃcient estimates is similar to that we saw with our simulation
results that showed improving the grandfather measure for a given father measure could worsen
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spillover. However, here we cannot distinguish this from decreasing attenuation bias since we do
not know the true population parameters.
Next, we perform a similar exercise in 5(c) only now varying fathers’ income measures while
we hold the measure for grandfathers constant at a 10-year average (T2 = 10). By using a “good”
measure of income for grandfathers, we can isolate the attenuation in the coeﬃcient for fathers,
and, more importantly for this setting, the spillover of bias into the coeﬃcient for grandfathers.
As expected, the coeﬃcient for fathers increases from about 0.09 to about 0.21 as we average over
more years, in line with our results from symmetrically improving income measures for fathers and
grandfathers in 5(a).
For grandfathers, the coeﬃcients are decreasing as we improve the income measure for fathers,
showing the reduction in spillover bias. We can also evaluate the counter-intuitive simulation result
by comparing the ﬁrst coeﬃcient of 0.06 in 5(c) when fathers’ income is measured using annual log
income (and a 10-year average is used for grandfathers) to the estimate of 0.04 in 5(a) when an
annual measure was used for both generations. One might be tempted to interpret this as lower
attenuation bias from using T2 = 10 in 5(c), but the fact that the grandfather coeﬃcient estimates
decrease as we increase T1 (holding T2 constant at 10) indicates that spillover bias is driving the
underlying diﬀerence. This is also consistent with our simulation results where the true grandfather
eﬀect was zero and we improved father’s measure to reduce the spillover. Based on our OLS results,
we cannot decisively rule out that the grandfather eﬀect in this sample is spurious and solely an
artifact of measurement error in fathers’ (average) income. If there is persistence in the transitory
component of income, even our OLS estimates based on a 25-year average of log income are likely
still biased.
Our IV approach has the advantage, at least theoretically in our simple simulation, of nearly
eliminating bias in this setting when Tg is large enough for the degree of persistence in vitg (e.g.,
after 6-10 years in our simulation). The bottom graphs in Figure 5 present the IV results analogous
to those for OLS above. First, in 5(d) we instrument for both fathers’ and grandfathers’ income at
the same age, using, respectively, fathers’ and grandfathers’ annual log income from a later year,
increasing the distance between years measured for endogenous and instrument income measures
as indicated on the x-axis. The coeﬃcient for fathers’ income increases from 0.11 to 0.30 as we
increase the number of years between the endogenous and instrument income measures, similar to
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the father-son IV results. The coeﬃcient for grandfathers’ income ﬂuctuates around 0.03-0.05 for
the 1-6 year measures, and is not statistically signiﬁcant for the 2-6 year estimates. The 10-year
estimate is smaller at 0.01 but is also based on a smaller sample (N=3,449, 68.1%). However,
replicating all of Figure 5 for this smaller sample reveals similar patterns, so sample composition
does not appear to be driving this small estimate. In general though, the pattern of increasing
father coeﬃcients and decreasing grandfather coeﬃcients as we improve the income measures is
also consistent with spillover bias from a poor income measure for fathers causing an upward bias
in the grandfather coeﬃcient.
Next we vary father and grandfather income measures separately to more carefully examine
spillover bias. We ﬁrst use the 6-year instrument for fathers’ income while changing the instrument
for grandfathers’ income. The pattern of results is similar to the analogous OLS results, with
the coeﬃcient on fathers’ income remaining steady, though at a slightly higher level of 0.23. The
coeﬃcient for grandfathers is never statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, but does increase
slightly as we increase T2. To check for lifecycle eﬀects, we turn to our reverse IV results (Appendix
Figure C.6). With the income measure at older ages treated as endogenous (so λt > 1), the pattern
is reversed and the grandfather coeﬃcient is declining as we increase T2 (and is closer to zero).
We next isolate the eﬀects of measurement issues arising from fathers’ income measures by
using a “good” measure for grandfathers’ (the 6-year instrument) in all estimations, while varying
the instrument for fathers’ income. In Figure 5(f) the coeﬃcient on fathers’ income rises from
0.11 to 0.32 as we increase the years between the endogenous and instrument income measures
from 1 to 10 years, which is nearly identical to the IV results in 5(d). Although the coeﬃcient
on grandfathers’ income ﬂuctuates, on average we do see it decreasing as we improve the measure
for fathers’ income, ranging from 0.08 to -0.03. Notably the coeﬃcient is negative in sign for a
couple of the longer-term scenarios, but the grandfather coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in any of these regressions. The reverse IV results are similar though the father
coeﬃcient ﬂuctuates around 0.3 for the longer-term averages, similar to the father-son reverse IV
results.
Overall, our OLS and IV results suggest that the true grandfather coeﬃcient for our sample
is very small, or possibly even zero. The OLS estimates based on longer-term income averages
are around 0.02-0.03. The IV estimates based on longer-term instruments ﬂuctuate around zero,
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with some being negative in sign. None of the longer-term estimates are statistically signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, although the IV estimates are quite imprecise. More importantly though, the
patterns in our empirical results mirror those found in the simulation, especially for OLS. Our IV
estimates vary more widely, likely due to sensitivity to lifecycle eﬀects, and also suggest persistence
in the transitory component of income matters. Although the IV estimates are imprecise, they
do provide a useful secondary empirical exercise for gauging bias. In general, our results show
that empirically researchers must be aware of how sensitive the grandfather coeﬃcient is to the
construction of the parental income measure, and the tendency for the estimates to be positively
biased.
5.4 Robustness checks
The above analysis is conducted with only men in all three generations. This allows us to focus on
a single lineage and avoid measurement issues related to the relatively low labor force participation
of women in the initial two generations. However, for the oﬀspring generation, there are fewer
diﬀerences between men and women. To examine whether our results are sensitive to only including
men, we have also conducted our analyses on the sample with both men and women in the ﬁnal
generation, as well as on a grandfather-father-daughter sample.
Figures 4 and 5 are replicated in the Appendix for the full sample with both men and women
in the youngest generation (Figures C.7 and C.8). In general, the coeﬃcients are slightly lower
than for men only, and more precise. The reduced level reﬂects generally lower intergenerational
persistence typically found for samples including women, while the improved precision follows from
the increased sample size. The patterns in the coeﬃcients are nearly identical to our results based
on sons only. The only divergence is the 10-year IV estimates, and based on the reverse IV results
for this sample, this appears to be an artifact of lifecycle bias.
6 Conclusion
The role of measurement error in estimating intergenerational income regressions has been ad-
dressed extensively in the literature. The resulting biases are fairly well understood and it has
become standard to construct income measures in a way that mitigates these biases. Even though
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some bias remains, we often have a sense of the size or at least direction of the remaining bias.
However, the implications of measurement error in the multigenerational regression are more com-
plicated and are becoming increasingly important as studies focus on estimating the conditional
eﬀect of grandparents to better understand rates of long-term mobility.
This paper illustrates the implications of measurement error in the multigenerational setting,
showing that the spillover of bias from measurement error in the parents’ income measures could
lead to misleading conclusions regarding the eﬀects of grandparents. Our simulations show that even
using a long-term average of income over 20 years during mid-life does not eliminate the potential
for estimating a spurious grandfather coeﬃcient. In addition, even when the true grandparent
coeﬃcient is zero, for a given measure of fathers’ income, increasing the years we average over for
grandfathers actually worsens the spillover bias. If we observe increasing coeﬃcient estimates as a
result, this could be misinterpreted as reducing attenuation bias in actual data settings where we do
not know the true grandparent coeﬃcient is zero. The IV approach we propose has the advantage
of theoretically mitigating (or eliminating) these biases with relatively short timespans of income,
depending on the degree of persistence in the transitory component of income. And, although the
IV estimator is more susceptible to lifecycle bias, one can easily test for this by obtaining two sets of
IV estimates—the original IV estimates and the “reverse IV” estimates switching the endogenous
and instrument income measures—which then provide bounds on the coeﬃcients.
With our administrative data, we see the expected result that time-averaging reduces attenua-
tion bias in OLS estimates in the intergenerational regression, and we also show similar results for
IV approaches that allow for persistence in the transitory component of annual income measures.
In the multigenerational setting, we show how the spillover of bias from measurement issues in fa-
thers’ income causes upward bias in the coeﬃcient for grandfathers’ income. Our OLS results based
on averaging over log incomes indicates that spillover bias may be causing a spurious grandfather
coeﬃcient estimate. Our IV approach is also consistent with this, and, although the estimates are
imprecise, they leave open the possibility of a zero grandfather coeﬃcient, or even a negative one,
as predicted by Becker & Tomes (1979).
Exploring transmission of socioeconomic status beyond two generations is an important direc-
tion in the literature, but researchers need to be even more cautious about biases from measurement
error than in the intergenerational setting. We focused on measurement issues with income in this
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paper, but measurement issues arise with all other status measures used as well. So, although
the theoretical results presented here are based on models speciﬁc to earnings dynamics, the is-
sue of spillover bias from measurement issues is not unique to income and should be taken into
consideration in any multigenerational regression setting.
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Appendix
A Derivations
The following provides derivations of the probability limits shown in the main text of the paper,
though here we do not assume stationarity as done in the paper. This means that below σ2xg and
σ2vg are allowed to vary across generations (g = 1, 2).
In the population, the true multigenerational process is:
yi0 = γ1xi1 + γ2xi2 + i. (17)
We observe annual earnings measures, x∗it1 for fathers and x
∗
it2 for grandfathers:
x∗it1 = xi1 + vit1, (18a)
x∗it2 = xi2 + vit2. (18b)
So the equation we estimate with our data is:
yi0 = γ1x
∗
it1 + γ2x
∗
it2 + 
∗
it. (19)
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A.1 OLS estimation
We can derive the OLS estimator of γ1 using the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and some algebra:
γˆ1,OLS = (x
∗′
1 M2x
∗
1)
−1x∗
′
1 M2y (20a)
= [x∗
′
1 (I − x∗2(x∗
′
2 x
∗
2)
−1x∗
′
2 )x
∗
1]
−1x∗
′
1 (I − x∗2(x∗
′
2 x
∗
2)
−1x∗
′
2 )y (20b)
= [x∗
′
1 x
∗
1 − x∗
′
1 x
∗
2(x
∗′
2 x2)
−1x∗
′
2 x
∗
1]
−1[x∗
′
1 y − x∗
′
1 x
∗
2(x
∗′
2 x
∗
2)
−1x∗
′
2 y] (20c)
=
[
N∑
i=1
x∗2i1 −
N∑
i=1
x∗i1x
∗
i2
N∑
i=1
x∗2i2
N∑
i=1
x∗i2x
∗
i1
]−1 [ N∑
i=1
x∗i1yi −
N∑
i=1
x∗i1x
∗
i2
N∑
i=1
x∗2i2
N∑
i=1
x∗i2yi
]
(20d)
...
γˆ1,OLS =
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1yi
∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i2 −
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1x
∗
i2
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i2yi∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i1
∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i2 −
(∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1x
∗
i2
)2 (20e)
Similarly, for γ2, we get:
γˆ2,OLS =
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i2yi
∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i1 −
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1x
∗
i2
∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1yi∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i1
∑N
i=1 x
∗2
i2 −
(∑N
i=1 x
∗
i1x
∗
i2
)2 (21)
Taking the probability limits gives us:
plim(γˆ1,OLS) =
cov(y, x∗1)var(x∗2)− cov(y, x∗2)cov(x∗1, x∗2)
var(x∗1)var(x∗2)− cov(x∗1, x∗2)2
(22a)
plim(γˆ2,OLS) =
cov(y, x∗2)var(x∗1)− cov(y, x∗1)cov(x∗1, x∗2)
var(x∗1)var(x∗2)− cov(x∗1, x∗2)2
(22b)
Now we substitute equations (18a) and (18b) and use assumptions underlying classical-errors-
in-variables (CEV): x1 and x2 are orthogonal to v1 and v2 as well as orthogonality between v1 and
v2. For notation, we deﬁne σ
2
xg ≡ var(xig) and σ2vg ≡ var(vitg) for g = 1, 2 and ρ ≡ corr(x1, x2).
43
Then the elements of the probability limits are:
var(x∗g) = σ
2
xg + σ
2
vg (23a)
cov(x∗1, x
∗
2) = ρσx1σx2 (23b)
cov(y, x∗1) = γ1σ
2
x1 + γ2ρσx1σx2 (23c)
cov(y, x∗2) = γ2σ
2
x2 + γ1ρσx1σx2 (23d)
Substituting these into (22a) and (22b) and rearranging gives us:
plim(γˆ1,OLS) = γ1
σ2x1
σ2x1 + σ
2
v1
(
σ2x2+σ
2
v2
σ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
) + γ2 σx1σx2
(
ρσ2v2
σ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
)
σ2x1 + σ
2
v1
(
σ2x2+σ
2
v2
σ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
) (24a)
plim(γˆ2,OLS) = γ1
σx1σx2
(
ρσ2v1
σ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
)
σ2x2 + σ
2
v2
(
σ2x1+σ
2
v1
σ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) + γ2 σ2x2
σ2x2 + σ
2
v2
(
σ2x1+σ
2
v1
σ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) (24b)
Although assuming that the transitory components are sources of classical measurement error
does lend to the simplicity of these probability limits, it is generally believed that there is some
persistence in the vitg over time. So we can write the AR(1) process for the vit where δ is the
autocorrelation coeﬃcient,
vitg = δvit−1g + eit. (25)
With this process for vitg, each σ
2
vg is replaced with
σ2e
1−δ2 in the probability limits above. Or
when we use T-year averages of annual income, each σ2vg is replaced with:
1
Tg
σ2e
1− δ2
[
1 + 2δ
(
Tg − 1−δTg1−δ
Tg(1− δ)
)]
. (26)
A.2 Instrumental variables (IV) estimation
Our IV approach uses log annual earnings in year s (z∗isg) to instrument for log annual earnings in
year t (x∗itg) for that individual. So, in addition to equations (18a) and (18b) above, we have for
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our instruments:
z∗is1 = xi1 + vis1, (27a)
z∗is2 = xi2 + vis2. (27b)
We deﬁne A2 = I − x∗2(z∗
′
2 x
∗
2)
−1z∗′2 , and again use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem and some
algebra to derive the IV estimators:
γˆ1,IV = (z
∗′
1 A2x
∗
1)
−1z∗
′
1 A2y (28a)
= [z∗
′
1 (I − x∗2(z∗
′
2 x
∗
2)
−1z∗
′
2 )x
∗
1]
−1z∗
′
1 (I − x∗2(z∗
′
2 x
∗
2)
−1z∗
′
2 )y (28b)
= [z∗
′
1 x
∗
1 − z∗
′
1 x
∗
2(z
∗′
2 x
∗
2)
−1z∗
′
2 x
∗
1]
−1[z∗
′
1 y − z∗
′
1 x
∗
2(z
∗′
2 x
∗
2)
−1z∗
′
2 y] (28c)
=
⎡
⎣ N∑
i=1
z∗i1x
∗
i1 −
N∑
i=1
z∗i1x
∗
i2
(
N∑
i=1
z∗i2x
∗
i2
)−1 N∑
i=1
z∗i2x
∗
i1
⎤
⎦−1
⎡
⎣ N∑
i=1
z∗i1yi −
N∑
i=1
z∗i1x
∗
i2
(
N∑
i=1
z∗i2x
∗
i2
)−1 N∑
i=1
z∗i2yi
⎤
⎦
(28d)
...
γˆ1,IV =
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1yi
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i2 −
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i2
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2yi∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i1
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i2 −
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i2
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i1
(28e)
Similarly, for γ2, we get:
γˆ2,IV =
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2yi
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i1 −
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i1
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1yi∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i2
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i1 −
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i2x
∗
i1
∑N
i=1 z
∗
i1x
∗
i2
(29)
Taking the probability limits we get:
plim(γˆ1,IV ) =
cov(z∗1 , y)cov(z∗2 , x∗2)− cov(z∗1 , x∗2)cov(z∗2 , y)
cov(z∗1 , x∗1)cov(z∗2 , x∗2)− cov(z∗1 , x∗2)cov(z∗2 , x∗1)
(30a)
plim(γˆ2,IV ) =
cov(z∗2 , y)cov(z∗1 , x∗1)− cov(z∗2 , x∗1)cov(z∗1 , y)
cov(z∗2 , x∗2)cov(z∗1 , x∗1)− cov(z∗2 , x∗1)cov(z∗1 , x∗2)
(30b)
Now we substitute equations (18a), (18b), (27a), and (27b) and use assumptions underlying
classical-errors-in-variables (CEV): x1 and x2 are orthogonal to v1 and v2; vit1 and vit2 are uncor-
related; vitg and visg are uncorrelated. For notation, we deﬁne σ
2
xg ≡ var(xig) and σ2vg ≡ var(vitg)
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for g = 1, 2 and ρ ≡ corr(x1, x2), allowing us to write the elements of the probability limits as:
cov(z∗g , x
∗
g) = σ
2
xg + cov(visg, vitg) = σ
2
xg + σ
2
vg (31a)
cov(x∗1, z
∗
2) = cov(x
∗
2, z
∗
1) = ρσx1σx2 (31b)
cov(y, z∗1) = γ1σ
2
x1 + γ2ρσx1σx2 (31c)
cov(y, z∗2) = γ2σ
2
x2 + γ1ρσx1σx2 (31d)
Substituting these into the probability limits in (30a) and (30b), and then doing some algebra
shows that plim(γˆ1,IV ) = γ1 and plim(γˆ2,IV ) = γ2. However, if we consider the case of an AR(1)
process for vitg, then (31a) does not hold. Rather, cov(visg, vitg) = δ
Tg
σ2eg
1−δ2 where Tg = t − s is
the years between the earnings measures xitg and zisg. In this case, the probability limits of the
IV estimators are the same as those for the OLS estimators in (24a) and (24b) except that σ2vg is
replaced with δTg
σ2eg
1−δ2 .
Table A.1 summarizes what takes the place of σ2vg under the two diﬀerent scenarios for the
transitory component (CEV or AR(1)) for each of our estimation approaches.
Table A.1: Elements that take place of σ2vg in plim(γˆ1) and plim(γˆ2)
Estimation method vitg ∼ CEV vitg ∼AR(1)
OLS using annual income measures σ2vg
σ2e1
1−δ2
OLS using Tg-year averages of income
σ2vg
Tg
1
Tg
σ2e1
1−δ2
[
1 + 2δ
(
Tg− 1−δ
T
g
1−δ
Tg(1−δ)
)]
IV using annual incomes Tg years apart n.a. δ
Tg σ
2
e1
1−δ2
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A.3 Lifecycle Eﬀects
We can also consider lifecycle proﬁles in income for fathers and grandfathers, where the relationship
between annual and lifetime or permanent income is written
x∗it1 = λt1xi1 + vit1, (32a)
x∗it2 = λ2txi2 + vit2. (32b)
Considering again the probability limits in equations (24a) and (24b), we can use the equations
in (32a) and (32b) to write the elements of the probability limits as:
var(x∗g) = λtgσ
2
xg + σ
2
vg (33a)
cov(x∗1, x
∗
2) = λt1λt2ρσx1σx2 (33b)
cov(y, x∗1) = λt1γ1σ
2
x1 + λt1γ2ρσx1σx2 (33c)
cov(y, x∗2) = λt2γ2σ
2
x2 + λt2γ1ρσx1σx2 (33d)
Then the OLS probability limits in equations (24a) and (24b) are now:
plim(γˆ1,OLS) = γ1
λ1tσ
2
x1
λ21tσ
2
x1 + σ
2
v1
(
λ22tσ
2
x2
+σ2v2
λ22tσ
2
x2
(1−ρ2)+σ2v2
) + γ2 λ1tσx1σx2
(
ρσ2v2
λ22tσ
2
x2
(1−ρ2)+σ2v2
)
λ21tσ
2
x1 + σ
2
v1
(
λ22tσ
2
x2
+σ2v2
λ22tσ
2
x2
(1−ρ2)+σ2v2
) (34a)
plim(γˆ2,OLS) = γ1
λ2tσx1σx2
(
ρσ2v1
λ21tσ
2
x1
(1−ρ2)+σ2v
)
λ22tσ
2
x2 + σ
2
v2
(
λ21tσ
2
x1
+σ2v1
λ21tσ
2
x1
(1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) + γ2 λ2tσ2x2
λ22tσ
2
x2 + σ
2
v2
(
λ21tσ
2
x1
+σ2v1
λ21tσ
2
x1
(1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) . (34b)
The equations for our instruments can now be written:
z∗is1 = λ1sxi1 + vis1, (35a)
z∗is2 = λ2sxi2 + vis2. (35b)
With IV estimation, if we assume the vitg are essentially white noise error, then the elements
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of the probability limits are:
cov(z∗g , x
∗
g) = σ
2
xg + cov(visg, vitg) = λgtλgsσ
2
xg (36a)
cov(x∗1, z
∗
2) = λ1tλ2sρσx1σx2 (36b)
cov(x∗2, z
∗
1) = λ2tλ1sρσx1σx2 (36c)
cov(y, z∗1) = λ1sγ1σ
2
x1 + λ1sγ2ρσx1σx2 (36d)
cov(y, z∗2) = λ2sγ2σ
2
x2 + λ2sγ1ρσx1σx2 (36e)
And the probability limits of the estimators are:
plim(γˆ1,IV ) = γ1
1
λ1t
(37a)
plim(γˆ2,IV ) = γ2
1
λ2t
(37b)
With IV estimation and an AR(1) process for vitg, the elements of the probability limits can be
written:
cov(z∗g , x
∗
g) = σ
2
xg + cov(visg, vitg) = λgtλgsσ
2
xg + δ
Tg
g
(
σ2e
1− δg
)
(38a)
cov(x∗1, z
∗
2) = λ1tλ2sρσx1σx2 (38b)
cov(x∗2, z
∗
1) = λ2tλ1sρσx1σx2 (38c)
cov(y, z∗1) = λ1sγ1σ
2
x1 + λ1sγ2ρσx1σx2 (38d)
cov(y, z∗2) = λ2sγ2σ
2
x2 + λ2sγ1ρσx1σx2 (38e)
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The probability limits of the IV estimators are below, except that σ2vg is replaced by δ
Tg
g
(
σ2e
1−δg
)
:
plim(γˆ1,IV ) = γ1
λ1sσ
2
x1
λ1sλ1tσ2x1 + σ
2
v1
(
λ2sλ2tσ2x2+σ
2
v2
λ2sλ2tσ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
) + γ2 λ1sσx1σx2
(
ρσ2v2
λ2sλ2tσ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
)
λ1sλ1tσ2x1 + σ
2
v1
(
λ2sλ2tσ2x2+σ
2
v2
λ2sλ2tσ2x2 (1−ρ2)+σ2v2
)
(39a)
plim(γˆ2,IV ) = γ1
λ2sσx1σx2
(
ρσ2v1
λ1sλ1tσ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
)
λ2sλ2tσ2x2 + σ
2
v2
(
λ1sλ1tσ2x1+σ
2
v1
λ1sλ1tσ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) + γ2 λ2sσ2x2
λ2sλ2tσ2x2 + σ
2
v2
(
λ1sλ1tσ2x1+σ
2
v1
λ1sλ1tσ2x1 (1−ρ2)+σ2v1
) .
(39b)
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B Simulations
B.1 Simulation results with lifecycle eﬀects
Figure B.1: Attenuation and spillover in OLS estimates when λ1 = λ2 = 1.2
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Figure B.2: Attenuation and spillover in OLS estimates when λ1 = λ2 = 0.8
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Figure B.3: Attenuation and spillover in IV estimates when λ1t = λ2t = 1.2, λ1s = λ2s = 1
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Figure B.4: Attenuation and spillover in IV estimates when λ1t = λ2t = 0.8, λ1s = λ2s = 1
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C Empirical results
C.1 Reverse IV results for main sample
Figure C.5: Attenuation and spillover in 2 generation IV estimates when income at older age is
used as the endogenous measure
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Figure C.6: Attenuation and spillover in 3 generation IV estimates when income at older age is
used as the endogenous measure
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C.2 Figures using men+women sample
Figure C.7: OLS and IV estimates from two-generation regressions. Men and women in ﬁnal
generation.
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
(a) Two-gen (S+F) - OLS
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
(b) Two-gen (S+G) - OLS
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
(c) Two-gen (S+F) - IV
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
0 5 10 15 20 25
(d) Two-gen (S+G) - IV
father coefficient father 95% CI
grandfather coefficient grandfather 95% CI
55
Figure C.8: OLS and IV estimates from three-generation regressions. Men and women in ﬁnal
generation.
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C.3 Tables of regression coeﬃcients
Men only (for men and women, see below).
See Tables C.2-C.9
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(a) Sons and fathers
Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.137 0.119 0.107 0.091 0.097 0.086 0.100
(0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
2 years 0.148 0.131 0.117 0.108 0.105 0.108
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
3 years 0.153 0.136 0.124 0.114 0.119
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
4 years 0.155 0.141 0.128 0.126
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
5 years 0.158 0.142 0.137
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
6 years 0.158 0.149
(0.019) (0.018)
10 years 0.174
(0.019)
15 years 0.190
(0.019)
20 years 0.209
(0.020)
25 years 0.214
(0.020)
(b) Sons and grandfathers
Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.070 0.054 0.043 0.048 0.054 0.045 0.041
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
2 years 0.073 0.058 0.054 0.059 0.059 0.051
(0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
3 years 0.071 0.063 0.062 0.063 0.060
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
4 years 0.073 0.068 0.066 0.065
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
5 years 0.077 0.071 0.067
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
6 years 0.078 0.072
(0.021) (0.020)
10 years 0.079
(0.021)
15 years 0.082
(0.021)
20 years 0.075
(0.020)
25 years 0.065
(0.019)
Table C.2: OLS estimates from two-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
31.Estimates from Figure 4 (panels a and b) in bold.58
(a) Sons and fathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.154 0.147 0.138 0.133 0.115 0.149 0.127
(0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018)
2 years 0.167 0.167 0.172 0.146 0.177 0.159
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.027) (0.023)
3 years 0.180 0.199 0.174 0.214 0.171
(0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.033) (0.025)
4 years 0.207 0.191 0.248 0.192
(0.031) (0.031) (0.037) (0.028)
5 years 0.202 0.261 0.224
(0.032) (0.039) (0.031)
6 years 0.270 0.237
(0.041) (0.034)
10 years 0.318
(0.053)
15 years 0.414
(0.057)
20 years 0.386
(0.068)
25 years 0.440
(0.076)
(b) Sons and grandfathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.086 0.059 0.077 0.077 0.067 0.067 0.059
(0.034) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
2 years 0.072 0.088 0.103 0.082 0.076 0.072
(0.033) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
3 years 0.105 0.109 0.101 0.093 0.083
(0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029)
4 years 0.128 0.103 0.117 0.092
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
5 years 0.114 0.116 0.114
(0.040) (0.035) (0.039)
6 years 0.135 0.105
(0.040) (0.038)
10 years 0.133
(0.077)
15 years
20 years
25 years
Table C.3: IV estimates from two-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38; 15-
year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
31.Estimates from Figure 4 (panels c and d) in bold.59
(a) Sons and fathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.192 0.164 0.147 0.119 0.130 0.109 0.121
(0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
2 years 0.232 0.199 0.163 0.147 0.145 0.132
(0.032) (0.029) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
3 years 0.265 0.212 0.186 0.157 0.162
(0.036) (0.031) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)
4 years 0.274 0.228 0.194 0.161
(0.037) (0.034) (0.029) (0.025)
5 years 0.300 0.227 0.200
(0.041) (0.033) (0.031)
6 years 0.292 0.234
(0.040) (0.035)
10 years 0.256
(0.041)
15 years 0.301
(0.050)
20 years 0.308
(0.056)
25 years 0.272
(0.050)
(b) Sons and grandfathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.092 0.083 0.053 0.064 0.079 0.059 0.064
(0.025) (0.032) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
2 years 0.109 0.085 0.059 0.081 0.079 0.071
(0.029) (0.033) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
3 years 0.109 0.088 0.068 0.080 0.086
(0.029) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027) (0.028)
4 years 0.111 0.098 0.069 0.083
(0.030) (0.038) (0.031) (0.030)
5 years 0.116 0.097 0.074
(0.031) (0.038) (0.034)
6 years 0.120 0.091
(0.033) (0.039)
10 years 0.073
(0.051)
15 years
20 years
25 years
Table C.4: “Reverse IV” estimates from two-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at
age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages
start at age 31. 60
Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.133 0.116 0.105 0.088 0.093 0.083 0.097
(0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
G 0.048 0.039 0.027 0.036 0.043 0.037 0.030
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
2 years F 0.143 0.127 0.113 0.103 0.100 0.105
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
G 0.047 0.037 0.034 0.044 0.046 0.038
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
3 years F 0.148 0.131 0.119 0.109 0.114
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
G 0.043 0.039 0.041 0.047 0.044
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
4 years F 0.150 0.135 0.123 0.121
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
G 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
5 years F 0.152 0.136 0.132
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
G 0.046 0.046 0.044
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
6 years F 0.152 0.143
(0.019) (0.018)
G 0.047 0.045
(0.021) (0.020)
10 years F 0.167
(0.019)
G 0.044
(0.021)
15 years F 0.183
(0.020)
G 0.043
(0.021)
20 years F 0.204
(0.021)
G 0.032
(0.020)
25 years F 0.210
(0.021)
G 0.023
(0.019)
Table C.5: OLS estimates from three-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
31. Estimates from Figure 5 (panel a) in bold.
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Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.168 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.169 0.170 0.170
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
G 0.043 0.032 0.016 0.023 0.033 0.025 0.023
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013)
2 years F 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.168 0.168 0.169
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
G 0.044 0.030 0.024 0.033 0.035 0.029
(0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
3 years F 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.168 0.168
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
G 0.039 0.032 0.032 0.036 0.035
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
4 years F 0.168 0.168 0.168 0.168
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
G 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.036
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
5 years F 0.168 0.168 0.168
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
G 0.042 0.039 0.036
(0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
6 years F 0.167 0.168
(0.019) (0.019)
G 0.043 0.040
(0.021) (0.020)
10 years F 0.167
(0.019)
G 0.044
(0.021)
15 years F 0.167
(0.019)
G 0.048
(0.021)
20 years F 0.168
(0.019)
G 0.041
(0.020)
25 years F 0.169
(0.019)
G 0.033
(0.019)
Table C.6: OLS estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for fathers. Note: 10-
year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Estimates from Figure 5 (panel b) in bold.
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Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.132 0.114 0.101 0.086 0.092 0.081 0.096
(0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
G 0.048 0.055 0.058 0.062 0.061 0.064 0.059
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
2 years F 0.142 0.125 0.110 0.102 0.099 0.103
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
G 0.047 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.059
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
3 years F 0.147 0.129 0.118 0.108 0.113
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
G 0.047 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.057
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
4 years F 0.149 0.134 0.122 0.120
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
G 0.047 0.052 0.055 0.055
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
5 years F 0.151 0.136 0.131
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
G 0.047 0.052 0.053
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
6 years F 0.152 0.143
(0.019) (0.018)
G 0.048 0.050
(0.021) (0.021)
10 years F 0.167
(0.019)
G 0.044
(0.021)
15 years F 0.184
(0.020)
G 0.040
(0.021)
20 years F 0.203
(0.021)
G 0.036
(0.021)
25 years F 0.208
(0.021)
G 0.035
(0.021)
Table C.7: OLS estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for grandfathers. Note:
10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Estimates from Figure 5 (panel c) in bold.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.148 0.144 0.132 0.127 0.110 0.144 0.119
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018)
G 0.051 0.028 0.048 0.054 0.050 0.043 0.045
(0.034) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022)
2 years F 0.164 0.161 0.162 0.138 0.171 0.149
(0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024)
G 0.025 0.046 0.064 0.054 0.045 0.050
(0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.026)
3 years F 0.172 0.190 0.166 0.206 0.160
(0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.034) (0.026)
G 0.044 0.064 0.055 0.045 0.056
(0.036) (0.032) (0.037) (0.030) (0.031)
4 years F 0.197 0.183 0.243 0.178
(0.032) (0.033) (0.039) (0.029)
G 0.065 0.053 0.032 0.061
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036)
5 years F 0.193 0.255 0.213
(0.034) (0.041) (0.034)
G 0.053 0.036 0.051
(0.043) (0.038) (0.042)
6 years F 0.263 0.227
(0.044) (0.036)
G 0.036 0.050
(0.047) (0.044)
10 years F 0.295
(0.052)
G 0.014
(0.084)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.8: IV estimates from three-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38.
Estimates from Figure 5 (panel d) in bold.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.229 0.236 0.232 0.227 0.231 0.231 0.229
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
G 0.043 0.010 0.030 0.044 0.027 0.027 0.026
(0.036) (0.029) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
2 years F 0.235 0.232 0.227 0.229 0.231 0.228
(0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.012 0.036 0.058 0.034 0.032 0.031
(0.036) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027)
3 years F 0.229 0.228 0.230 0.228 0.227
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.042 0.063 0.041 0.040 0.037
(0.038) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032)
4 years F 0.223 0.231 0.228 0.224
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)
G 0.074 0.043 0.048 0.043
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
5 years F 0.228 0.230 0.225
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
G 0.048 0.050 0.049
(0.044) (0.040) (0.043)
6 years F 0.226 0.227
(0.037) (0.036)
G 0.058 0.050
(0.046) (0.044)
10 years F 0.198
(0.042)
G 0.058
(0.082)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.9: IV estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for fathers. Note: 10-year
averages start at age 38. Estimates from Figure 5 (panel e) in bold.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.146 0.140 0.131 0.125 0.109 0.142 0.118
(0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) (0.018)
G 0.057 0.066 0.068 0.075 0.081 0.071 0.086
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
2 years F 0.159 0.161 0.164 0.140 0.168 0.148
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.028) (0.024)
G 0.053 0.059 0.059 0.071 0.067 0.079
(0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042)
3 years F 0.173 0.193 0.170 0.206 0.161
(0.028) (0.032) (0.028) (0.034) (0.026)
G 0.048 0.050 0.057 0.055 0.077
(0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.042)
4 years F 0.201 0.190 0.243 0.182
(0.033) (0.032) (0.040) (0.029)
G 0.039 0.051 0.037 0.071
(0.043) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042)
5 years F 0.199 0.260 0.215
(0.033) (0.043) (0.033)
G 0.039 0.031 0.051
(0.043) (0.040) (0.043)
6 years F 0.265 0.227
(0.044) (0.036)
G 0.018 0.050
(0.045) (0.044)
10 years F 0.315
(0.056)
G 0.024
(0.047)
15 years F 0.430
(0.062)
G -0.032
(0.049)
20 years F 0.373
(0.072)
G 0.016
(0.049)
25 years F 0.438
(0.085)
G -0.012
(0.051)
Table C.10: IV estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for grandfathers. Note:
10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Estimates from Figure 5 (panel f) in bold.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.185 0.157 0.143 0.114 0.124 0.104 0.116
(0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
G 0.053 0.053 0.025 0.044 0.058 0.044 0.050
(0.025) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.022) (0.020)
2 years F 0.222 0.189 0.159 0.140 0.137 0.129
(0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
G 0.061 0.049 0.025 0.051 0.056 0.050
(0.030) (0.034) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027)
3 years F 0.256 0.204 0.180 0.149 0.155
(0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025)
G 0.043 0.046 0.031 0.044 0.061
(0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.027) (0.030)
4 years F 0.264 0.218 0.188 0.156
(0.039) (0.035) (0.031) (0.026)
G 0.045 0.051 0.023 0.049
(0.032) (0.039) (0.033) (0.033)
5 years F 0.290 0.216 0.195
(0.043) (0.035) (0.033)
G 0.045 0.049 0.027
(0.034) (0.040) (0.037)
6 years F 0.283 0.222
(0.042) (0.036)
G 0.038 0.060
(0.036) (0.045)
10 years F 0.265
(0.048)
G -0.004
(0.056)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.11: “Reverse IV” estimates from three-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start
at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages
start at age 31.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.227 0.225 0.232 0.230 0.226 0.229 0.227
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
G 0.045 0.050 0.011 0.021 0.041 0.024 0.034
(0.027) (0.034) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021)
2 years F 0.225 0.223 0.232 0.229 0.225 0.228
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.052 0.054 0.013 0.027 0.042 0.031
(0.032) (0.036) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027)
3 years F 0.223 0.224 0.231 0.228 0.225
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.054 0.055 0.015 0.028 0.046
(0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030)
4 years F 0.224 0.222 0.231 0.228
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.055 0.061 0.015 0.028
(0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.033)
5 years F 0.223 0.220 0.230
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
G 0.057 0.063 0.018
(0.035) (0.043) (0.037)
6 years F 0.220 0.222
(0.037) (0.036)
G 0.061 0.060
(0.037) (0.045)
10 years F 0.249
(0.043)
G -0.020
(0.056)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.12: “Reverse IV” estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for fathers.
Note: 10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at
age 33; and 25-year averages start at age 31.
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.182 0.154 0.136 0.111 0.123 0.103 0.113
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018)
G 0.049 0.058 0.064 0.067 0.066 0.070 0.081
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
2 years F 0.220 0.187 0.153 0.139 0.137 0.126
(0.033) (0.030) (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
G 0.045 0.053 0.058 0.062 0.062 0.079
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.044)
3 years F 0.252 0.200 0.176 0.148 0.154
(0.038) (0.033) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025)
G 0.040 0.048 0.055 0.060 0.073
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044)
4 years F 0.262 0.220 0.183 0.153
(0.040) (0.036) (0.031) (0.026)
G 0.034 0.046 0.053 0.074
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044)
5 years F 0.290 0.219 0.187
(0.045) (0.035) (0.033)
G 0.031 0.045 0.067
(0.040) (0.040) (0.045)
6 years F 0.280 0.222
(0.042) (0.036)
G 0.033 0.060
(0.040) (0.045)
10 years F 0.242
(0.044)
G 0.057
(0.046)
15 years F 0.309
(0.055)
G 0.011
(0.048)
20 years F 0.302
(0.061)
G 0.044
(0.048)
25 years F 0.270
(0.056)
G 0.019
(0.054)
Table C.13: “Reverse IV” estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for grandfa-
thers. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages
start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age 31.
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C.4 Tables for sample of men+women
See Tables C.14-C.20
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(a) Sons/daughters and fathers
Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.126 0.100 0.094 0.086 0.098 0.080 0.084
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
2 years 0.130 0.113 0.105 0.105 0.102 0.094
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
3 years 0.134 0.120 0.117 0.110 0.109
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
4 years 0.137 0.128 0.120 0.116
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
5 years 0.143 0.130 0.125
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
6 years 0.144 0.134
(0.013) (0.012)
10 years 0.155
(0.013)
15 years 0.169
(0.014)
20 years 0.181
(0.014)
25 years 0.188
(0.014)
(b) Sons/daughters and grandfathers
Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.056 0.053 0.043 0.049 0.044 0.048 0.040
(0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
2 years 0.065 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.052
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
3 years 0.065 0.062 0.058 0.061 0.058
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
4 years 0.069 0.064 0.063 0.063
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
5 years 0.070 0.068 0.065
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
6 years 0.073 0.070
(0.015) (0.014)
10 years 0.073
(0.015)
15 years 0.082
(0.016)
20 years 0.081
(0.016)
25 years 0.074
(0.015)
Table C.14: OLS estimates from two-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
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(a) Sons/daughters and fathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.137 0.130 0.119 0.131 0.111 0.121 0.106
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
2 years 0.153 0.142 0.161 0.137 0.152 0.129
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
3 years 0.158 0.180 0.153 0.176 0.143
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
4 years 0.196 0.165 0.193 0.155
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021)
5 years 0.181 0.202 0.170
(0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
6 years 0.218 0.181
(0.027) (0.024)
10 years 0.256
(0.034)
15 years 0.335
(0.039)
20 years 0.402
(0.054)
25 years 0.372
(0.054)
(b) Sons/daughters and grandfathers
Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years 0.083 0.060 0.076 0.064 0.073 0.066 0.047
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
2 years 0.072 0.087 0.081 0.087 0.080 0.058
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
3 years 0.101 0.087 0.102 0.094 0.069
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021)
4 years 0.100 0.108 0.110 0.076
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
5 years 0.121 0.115 0.090
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
6 years 0.133 0.088
(0.030) (0.027)
10 years 0.178
(0.052)
15 years
20 years
25 years
Table C.15: IV estimates from two-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
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Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.123 0.097 0.092 0.083 0.095 0.077 0.081
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
G 0.039 0.040 0.030 0.039 0.034 0.041 0.032
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
2 years F 0.126 0.110 0.102 0.101 0.098 0.091
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
G 0.045 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.042
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
3 years F 0.130 0.115 0.113 0.105 0.105
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
G 0.043 0.043 0.040 0.046 0.044
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
4 years F 0.133 0.123 0.115 0.111
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
G 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.047
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
5 years F 0.138 0.125 0.120
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
G 0.045 0.047 0.046
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
6 years F 0.139 0.129
(0.013) (0.012)
G 0.048 0.048
(0.015) (0.014)
10 years F 0.149
(0.013)
G 0.044
(0.015)
15 years F 0.162
(0.014)
G 0.049
(0.016)
20 years F 0.174
(0.014)
G 0.045
(0.016)
25 years F 0.181
(0.015)
G 0.038
(0.015)
Table C.16: OLS estimates from three-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.151 0.151 0.153 0.151 0.152 0.151 0.151
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
G 0.034 0.033 0.021 0.029 0.028 0.033 0.026
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009)
2 years F 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.151 0.150
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
G 0.040 0.032 0.030 0.033 0.036 0.034
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
3 years F 0.150 0.150 0.151 0.150 0.150
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
G 0.038 0.036 0.034 0.039 0.038
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
4 years F 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
G 0.041 0.038 0.039 0.040
(0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)
5 years F 0.150 0.150 0.150
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
G 0.042 0.042 0.040
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
6 years F 0.150 0.150
(0.013) (0.013)
G 0.045 0.043
(0.015) (0.014)
10 years F 0.149
(0.013)
G 0.044
(0.015)
15 years F 0.148
(0.013)
G 0.052
(0.016)
20 years F 0.148
(0.013)
G 0.052
(0.016)
25 years F 0.149
(0.013)
G 0.046
(0.015)
Table C.17: OLS estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for fathers. Note:
10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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Income averaged Age starting from...
over... 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.122 0.096 0.090 0.082 0.093 0.075 0.079
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
G 0.050 0.055 0.056 0.059 0.056 0.060 0.058
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
2 years F 0.125 0.108 0.100 0.100 0.097 0.089
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
G 0.050 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
3 years F 0.129 0.114 0.111 0.104 0.104
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
G 0.049 0.052 0.052 0.054 0.054
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
4 years F 0.132 0.123 0.115 0.111
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
G 0.049 0.050 0.052 0.052
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
5 years F 0.138 0.125 0.120
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
G 0.047 0.050 0.051
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
6 years F 0.139 0.129
(0.013) (0.013)
G 0.047 0.049
(0.015) (0.015)
10 years F 0.149
(0.013)
G 0.044
(0.015)
15 years F 0.163
(0.014)
G 0.041
(0.015)
20 years F 0.175
(0.014)
G 0.039
(0.015)
25 years F 0.182
(0.015)
G 0.037
(0.015)
Table C.18: OLS estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for grandfathers. Note:
10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.132 0.127 0.113 0.126 0.105 0.117 0.101
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
G 0.057 0.036 0.054 0.045 0.057 0.049 0.034
(0.024) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
2 years F 0.150 0.135 0.154 0.128 0.146 0.122
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
G 0.037 0.057 0.048 0.064 0.053 0.040
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
3 years F 0.150 0.172 0.144 0.167 0.135
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019)
G 0.059 0.056 0.070 0.058 0.043
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
4 years F 0.188 0.154 0.184 0.145
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
G 0.056 0.074 0.056 0.048
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
5 years F 0.169 0.192 0.160
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
G 0.078 0.061 0.045
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
6 years F 0.206 0.171
(0.029) (0.025)
G 0.070 0.044
(0.032) (0.030)
10 years F 0.200
(0.035)
G 0.104
(0.055)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.19: IV estimates from three-generation models. Note: 10-year averages start at age 38;
15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33; and 25-year averages start at age
31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.172 0.176 0.173 0.172 0.173 0.174 0.174
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
G 0.051 0.027 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.039 0.022
(0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
2 years F 0.175 0.172 0.171 0.170 0.173 0.173
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
G 0.033 0.053 0.055 0.056 0.047 0.027
(0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
3 years F 0.170 0.171 0.169 0.169 0.172
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
G 0.062 0.060 0.065 0.056 0.033
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
4 years F 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.171
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
G 0.069 0.070 0.065 0.037
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
5 years F 0.167 0.169 0.171
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
G 0.077 0.070 0.043
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
6 years F 0.167 0.171
(0.025) (0.025)
G 0.080 0.044
(0.033) (0.030)
10 years F 0.146
(0.027)
G 0.131
(0.055)
15 years F
G
20 years F
G
25 years F
G
Table C.20: IV estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for fathers. Note: 10-
year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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Time diﬀerence Age starting from...
obs. - instr. 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
1 years F 0.125 0.122 0.110 0.122 0.104 0.111 0.098
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
G 0.054 0.054 0.057 0.059 0.062 0.061 0.067
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
2 years F 0.143 0.133 0.153 0.128 0.140 0.119
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018)
G 0.049 0.051 0.045 0.057 0.053 0.063
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)
3 years F 0.147 0.172 0.146 0.162 0.133
(0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019)
G 0.048 0.040 0.047 0.049 0.057
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
4 years F 0.187 0.158 0.180 0.145
(0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022)
G 0.037 0.044 0.038 0.057
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
5 years F 0.173 0.192 0.160
(0.023) (0.026) (0.024)
G 0.041 0.035 0.046
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
6 years F 0.204 0.171
(0.028) (0.025)
G 0.033 0.044
(0.029) (0.030)
10 years F 0.247
(0.036)
G 0.024
(0.031)
15 years F 0.336
(0.042)
G -0.013
(0.033)
20 years F 0.387
(0.056)
G -0.008
(0.034)
25 years F 0.363
(0.058)
G -0.005
(0.035)
Table C.21: IV estimates from three-generation models, long-term average for grandfathers. Note:
10-year averages start at age 38; 15-year averages start at age 36; 20-year averages start at age 33;
and 25-year averages start at age 31. Men and women in ﬁnal generation
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